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Gay legal theory is at a crossroads reminiscent of the sameness/difference
debate in feminist circles and the integrationist debate in critical race theory.
Formal equality theorists take the heterosexual model as the norm and then seek
to show that gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexuals-except for their choice
of partners--are just like heterosexuals. Antisubordination theorists attack the
heterosexual model itself and try to demonstrate that a society that insists on
such a model is unjust Neither of these strategies is wholly satisfactory. The
formal equality model will fail to bring about fimdamental reforms as long as
sexual minorities are perceived as different from straights, while the outsider
modelfeeds perceptions of difference.
In A Different Kind of Sameness, Professor Nancy Levit explores the
development of tolerance for sexual minorities, looking at both cultural
signifiers and law. The grudging acceptance that is developing both culturally
and legally, is one of the hallmarks of the formation of an underclass group. The
Article suggests that the challenges for gay legal theory are twofold: to move
away from the frailties of both formal equality and antisubordination theories,
and to develop ways of representing sexual minorities that will make them more
acceptable, ifnot valuable, in a broader cultural context.
Professor Levit proposes changing the rhetoric and doctrine of equality
theory by developing a theory of respect for the common humanity of all people
Unlike antisubordination theory, shared humanity seeks assimilation into the
dominant culture, while still resisting many of the culture's traditional
institutions and interpretations. Unlike formal equality, a theory of shared
humanity does not rest on the heterosexual norm. Instead, it draws on
knowledge in anthropology, sociology, philosophy and psychology in the search
for those qualities, characteristics, needs, and desires that make us-all of us-
the same aspeople
I. INTRODUCTON
Our culture treats sexual orientation as a matter of "idiosyncratic
personal... taste"1 rather than as a determinant of family, equality, power and
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. Thanks to David
Achtenberg, Brian Bix, Kris Kobach, Doug Linder, John Ragsdale, and Rob Verchick for their
comments on drafts of this article. I am particularly indebted to June Carbone and Sam
Marcosson for helping me crystallize a number of points. Bob Hayman, your influence on my
work and thinking is invaluable. This research was supported by a grant from the UMKC Law
Foundation.
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group belonging. A recent New Republic article by Lee Siegel criticized queer
theory for "the sexualization of everything."2 "Queers," Siegel charges-and he
doesn't use the term affectionately-"are engaged in a vast theoretical project of
breaking up fixed sexual identities into the fluidity of sexual acts or practices.
Instead of whom you have sex with, queer theory is interested in how you obtain
sexual pleasure. Queer denotes 'genitality,' masturbation, and 'fisting,'; cross-
dressing, transvestism, and sadomasochism. ' 3
The popular construction of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and lransgendered
individuals as deviant has fostered novel forms of homophobia. These new forms
of hatred, fear, and misunderstanding have inspired antigay rhetoric such as that
of Senator Trent Lott, who compared homosexuality to alcoholism, "sex
addiction," and kleptomania.4 The religious right has weighed in recently with
the "ex-gay" religious movement promoting the conversion of sexual others to
heterosexuality by sponsoring a "'homosexuals can be cured' ad campaigrL5
In short, the cultural representations of gay and lesbian identity and
relationships are reduced to sexual behavior-fisting and fucking. The dominant
cultural construction of gay and lesbian relationships presents an image of sex
acts rather than one of relationships. The portraits of lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
and transgendered individuals ("sexual others" or "sexual outsiders") are of
people not quite fully human, deviant, and deficient morally.
This Article explores the relations between cultural re-presentations of
sexual others and legal theory about sexual outsiders ("gay legal theory"). It
suggests that gay legal theory faces difficulties in the development of a coherent
strategy for garnering rights and respect. Those difficulties center on an uneasy
tension among theorists, some of whom remain committed to a model that
pursues formal equality under heterosexual norms, others of whom adopt an
outsider strategy that challenges heteronormativity. This choice of models for
legal theory and litigation strategies has significant implications for the cultural
presentation of sexual minorities. The formal equality model will fail to
transform the status of sexual others as long as they are perceived as "different"
from straights, while the outsider or antisubordination model tends to feed
Construction ofIdentity, 6 TEx. . WOMEN & L. 47, 57 (1996).
2 Lee Siegel, The Gay ScienceNEW REPUBUC, Nov. 9, 1998, at 30.
3 Id. at 32.
4 Alison Mitchell, Controversy Over Loft's Views of Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17,
1998, at 24.
5 Doug Ireland, Gay Ed for Kids, NATION, June 14, 1999, at 8. Both the American
Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association have rejected Christian
'reparative" therapy as unfounded, saying it could cause "depression, anxiety, and self-
destructive behavior." Woody Baird, '90s Crusade to 'Convert' Gays, CH. TRIB., Apr. 16,
1999, § 2, at 8.
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perceptions of difference.
In Part II, this Article examines the development of tolerance for lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people, looking at both cultural signifiers and
law. It is a particular sort of tolerance that is developing, repressive tolerance-a
grudging acceptance that is one of the hallmarks of the enduring formation of
other underclass groups. Once the social designation is made that a group
violates behavioral norms, the expectation is that the group should change rather
than that the law should eliminate any structural inequalities.6 Negative cultural
representations shape governmental unwillingness to protect sexual minorities
from discrimination, but the influence runs in both directions. Law also has
instrumental effects on cultural representation: when law silences these facets of
identity, this gives permission for cultural silencing.
Part III explores two ideological tensions that occur against this backdrop of
intolerance, one within gay legal theory, and the other between gay legal theory
and judicial practice. The first tension among gay legal theorists is whether the
objective should be to develop an ideal model that implicitly judges some
relationships as more worthy than others, or an outsider strategy that seeks to
destabilize the existing view of sexual others without offering a replacement.
While many, if not most, of the practical successes for sexual others have
emanated from the formal equality model,7 the model is fraught with difficulties.
Equality theory demands line-drawing, which in the case of the rights of sexual
minorities, may mean embracing an ideal model and using it to draw lines to
distinguish among sexual others. Since the ideal model for formal equality
theory has been based on heterosexual norms, this means the lines have been
drawn between committed partnerships and multiple relationships, between
flamboyant queens and straight-acting suburban couples, between gays or
lesbians and other gender hybrids.
A second flaw of the formal equality model is tied to the reliance on
heterosexual norms. If respect for gay and lesbian relationships comes only from
their resemblance to categories of straight relationships, how can laws transform
consciousness? This idealized model has as its reference point traditional gender
norms (and biases), and it makes abnormal any relationships other than
heterosexual ones. In looking for sameness, do we risk continued
subordination?s
6 See John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1951
(1999).
7 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993).
8 See Susan P. Sturm, Sameness and Subordination: The Dangers of a Universal
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The second ideological tension is the practical incarnation of the first- the
prevailing theoretical model is not the model that seems to influence courts.
Most discussion in the academy favors a framework that seeks to provide
support for outsider groups.9 The ideas that motivate courts, however, seem to be
structured around an equal rights framework based on individualism. 10
The strategic challenge for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered groups
is dramatic: while advances can be gained by developing legal strategies that use
an individual rights model, the successes may be partial and ultimately
dangerous. Any victories based on a rights model may use the civil rights
precedents of other disempowered groups in ways that contribute to the
limitation rather than expansion of civil rights more generally.
In Part IV, this Article will address the prospects for moving beyond formal
equality and outsider theories to change the rhetoric and doctrine of equality
theory by developing a theory of respect for the common humanity of all people.
This theory of shared humanity attempts to engage the tensions of assimilation
and resistance-it seeks both acceptance of sexual others by the dominant
culture and radical resistance to many of the culture's traditional institutions and
interpretations. Shared humanity departs from formal equality, since it does not
look at the ways sexual minorities are like heterosexuals, but instead looks for
common features of personhood. Here I turn to literature in anthropology,
sociology, philosophy, and psychology in the search for those qualities,
characteristics, needs, and desires that makes us-all of us-the same as people.
Shared humanity recognizes the essentialist risks of any homogenizing
strategy: a theory that looks for similarities among individuals apart from group
belonging threatens to ambiguate the meaning of sexual identity. Thus the
humanist theory advanced here requires respect for identity differences and
careful attention to the process of cultural construction of differences, both of
which necessitate the understandings that identities are fluid, knowledge is
contextual, and truths can be a matter of perspective. The theory of shared
humanity tries to distinguish between appropriate and inaccurate constructions of
identity differences through the use of reason and empirical evidence from a
variety of disciplines.
The Article concludes by returning to the question of cultural re-presentation
of sexual others. It asks in what ways gay legal theory can represent sexual
outsiders and their relations that will make them more acceptable, if not valuable,
in a broader cultural context.
Solution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 57-72.
10 Seesupra note 7 and infra text accompanying notes 97-121,278.
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II. SocIAL AND LEGAL TOLERANCE FOR SEXUAL OTHERS
A. Is Cultural Acceptance Increasing?
In the late 1990s, both popular essayists and legal academics have debated
whether social and legal tolerance for lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
transgendered people is increasing or decreasing. 1 Perhaps coming out now is
easier in many contexts than at any time in recent history.12 Most straights now
know someone who is gay, and they know that they know. A decade ago, the
words "gay" and "lesbian" were taboo in the media.' 3 In that same time frame,
newspapers have been convinced to reverse their policies about listing same-sex
surviving partners in obituaries. Independent gay presses are cornering a larger
share of the market, while gays and lesbians populate an increasing number of
mainstream fiction and nonfiction books.14
National political action organizations and support groups have promoted
political, legal, and social acceptance of sexual others. The Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), formed in 1985, fights for fair and
II See, eg., Robert D. Davila, Organization Helps Families Understand Homosexuality,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 18, 1999, at BI (quoting national PFLAG President Paul Beeman,
"We've seen remarkable growth in the number of parents who are eager to share unconditional
love for their gay and lesbian kids."); Carey Goldberg, Acceptance of Gays Up, But Most Still
Disapprove, Study Says, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, May 31, 1998, at A15 ("U.S.
acceptance of gay men and lesbians has grown significantly in recent years, as has support for
their civil rights, but a majority of the population still disapproves of homosexuals, according
to a study by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force .... Gay men and lesbians remain two
of the least-liked groups in the country, the survey found.). But see Mary Louis Fellows et al.,
Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 3-4 (1998)
(remarking on both "greater societal tolerance" for sexual minorities and "increased hostility");
Jonathan Ng, The Invisible Honest Teen, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 27, 1998, at F10 (reporting on
a recent survey of 3,000 students done for Who's Who Among American High School
Students, showing a "decrease in tolerance for people of other races and homosexuals").
12 See Hilary E. Ware, Note, Celebrity Privacy Rights and Free Speech: Recalibrating
Tort Remedies for "Outed" Celebrities, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449,455 (1997) ('studies
show that the single most relevant factor in determining the attitude an individual has towards
gay men and lesbians is whether or not she knows someone gay"); Joseph P. Shapiro et al.,
Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 5, 1993, at 42, 46 (between 1985
and 1993, the percentage of Americans who "personally know someone' who is gay increased
from 25% to 30% to 53%).
13 A Brief Introduction to GL4AD (visited Apr. 24, 2000) <http/www.glaad.org/glaad
history.html>.
14 See David Sexton, Can Literature Really Be Gay?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July
31, 1991, at 10; Two Political Figures Extend the Boundaries of Gay Literature, CHL TRIB.,
Aug. 25, 1996, at 5.
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accurate media representations based on sexual orientation. Parents, Families,
and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG), a nonprofit support group formed in
1981, has grown to more than 75,000 members in countries around the world.15
Other markers of greater social acceptance include increased visibility in
news and pop culture images. From "Silkwood" to India's first lesbian film,
'Fire," we see some less-cliched, less one-dimensional portraits. There has been
a movement from the ice-pick lesbians in "Basic Instinct' to friendly, accessible,
girl-next-door lesbians, like "Ellen." An increasing number of cities sponsor gay
pride parades.16 The very idea that homosexuality exists is seeping into the
culture, and some of the cultural images are changing.
B. Tolerance "Lite" and Deepening Hostility
In some ways, though, the representation of gay and lesbian lives on the eve
of a new millenium is little more than a flat stereotype. Mainstream television
has not gone very far--gays and lesbians are portrayed in nowhere near their
numbers in the population.17 Bisexuals and transgendered individuals are
portrayed nowhere. In commercials, almost everyone is straight18 In some
15 See Davila, supra note 11, at B1.
16 Compare Queer Resources Directory, Queer Events: 1993 (visited Apr. 24, 2000)
<http'//www.qrd/events/1993/pride.dates.93> (listing 61 gay and lesbian pride celebrations in
Canada, Europe, Africa, and the United States in 1993) with International Association of
Lesbian/Gay Pride Coordinators, Interpride Global Calendar 1998 (last modified June 17,
1998) <http'/www.qrd.org/qrdlorgs/lALGPCinterpride.global.caIendar.update-06.18.98>
(listing 239 such celebrations around the world in 1998).
17 Estimates on the incidence of homosexuality in the population vary. See ALFRED C.
KINSEY Er AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948) (estimating that
approximately 10%of males are gay); Christopher Hewitt; Homosexual Demography:
Implications for the Spread of AIDS, 35 J. SEX RES. 390, 390 (1998) (citing a 1994 survey by
the Yankelovich Monitor that guaranteed anonymity to participants in which "5.7% of the
respondents described themselves as either gay, lesbian, or homosexual'); Joannie M. Schrof
& Betsy Wagner, Sex in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1994, at 74,76 ("[J]ust
2.8 percent of men and 1.A percent of women say they are gay. When the question is broader,
10.1 percent of men and 8.6 percent of women either identify themselves as gay, say they have
had a sexual experience with someone of the same gender or claim to have some physical
attraction to members of the same sex."). Even assuming the more conservative estimates of 3-
5%, one of every twenty or thirty characters on television is not lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgendered. See Martin Renzhofer, Hollywood Has Its Mind on Sex for Fall Season, SALT
LAE TAM., July 23, 1999, at Fl1 (noting that the four major networks plan to "unveil 17 gay
characters" for fall programming and remarking in a curiously optimistic tone that "Hollywood
has come out of the closet," since this is 'about the same number as black, Asian and Latino
characters combined.").
18 Some companies are producing ads showing same-sex couples, but run them only in
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spheres, sexual minorities are still depicted as dangerous predators, killers, and
psychopaths, 19 or as flat stereotypes 0 Once the wholesome girl-next-door
emerges from the closet, her show is promptly cancelled.21 The evolution in the
depiction of gays and lesbians on screen is a movement from the pre-1980s
consensus that "'gay is evil"' 22 to an idea that gay people are potentially
acceptable, as long as no attention is given to their lifestyles, relationships, or
sexuality.23
The social acceptance of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals seems to
have reached some invisible limit, and there has been retrenchment A number of
colleges have either refused to include sexual orientation among the categories of
people protected under their antidiscrimination policies or have redacted the
category 24 In 1998, Maine became the first state to reverse its law that
certain targeted media, such as gay magazines. Others are beginning to have ads that are at
least ambiguous. See, e.g., Nan Alamilla Boyd, Shopping for Rights: Gays, Lesbians, and
Visibility Polities, 75 DENy. U. L. REv. 1361, 1361 (1998) (describing an Anheuser-Busch
commercial that positions the caption 'SIGNIFICANT OTHER"' over a bottle of Bud Light
leaning against a can of Bud Light).
19 If a psychopath happens to be gay, the intersection of those qualifies commands
excessive media attention. Look at the press given to five victim spree killer Andrew Cunanan.
In the psycho-serial killer sweepstakes, he does not come close to Manson, Speck, Bundy, or
Kaczynski, but he was gay and out and lived "the lifestyle." See Dan Savage, Gays, Lesbians
Can't Have Heroes (DeGeneres) Without Monsters (Cunanan), SEATrE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 27, 1997, at E3. Television announcer Tom Brokaw called Cunanan a
"homicidal homosexual." Richard Goldstein, On Cunanan, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 6, 1998, at
30; see also WILD THNGS (Sony 1998); BOUND (Republic 1996); SILENCE OF THE LAMBS
(Orion 1991); BASIC INSTNCr (ri Star 1992); CRUISING (LORIMAR FnMs 1980). But see THE
OBJECr OF MY AFFECION (20th Century Fox 1998); IN AND OUT (Paramount 1998); MY BEST
FRIEND'S WEDDING (Tri Star 1997); PHILADELPHIA (Tri Star 1993); LIANNA (United Artists
Classics 1983); PERSONAL BEST (Geffen 1982). See generally Vrro Russo, THE CELLULOID
CLOsET: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THmMOviES (1981).
20 See, e.g., TO WONG FOO, THANKS FOR EVERYTHING, JULIE NEWMAR (Universal 1995);
THE BIRDCAGE (United Artists 1995).
21 Other shows, such as Will and Grace, are developing gay characters who are portrayed
without sexuality as the primary facet of their identity. But of course Will and Grace also
boasts the stereotypically flamboyant Jack. See Will and Grace (NBC television broadcast,
1998-pres.)
2 2 Kevin Thomas, De Milles Road, Returns to Silent Era, LA. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at
F10 (referencing film historian Danny Mangin's film clips and lecture, "Psycho Killers and
Twisted Sisters").
23 The Object of My Affection and My Best Friend's Wedding, for instance, have major
characters who are gay, but the movies are not about actually being gay. The gay people in
these movies are largely a vehicle through which a straight character becomes a healthier
heterosexual.
24 Diane Carroll, Gays Criticize Policy Revisions, KAN. CrrY STAR, Dec. 2, 1998, at B3
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prohibited discrimination against gays in employment, housing, and public
accommodations. 25 In a 1998 survey of teenagers featured in Who's Who
Among American High School Students, 48% admitted "they are prejudiced
against homosexuals," a rise of 19 percentage points from a similar survey the
year before.26 Conservative groups consistently mount strong opposition to gay
awareness education in public schools.27
Antigay zealots increased their violence in late century. The pistol-whipping
death of college student Matthew Shepard in Wyoming in October of 1998 drew
attention to antigay violence for a time. The national media reported the array of
antigay crimes as follows: grafitti, vandalism, offensive and intimidating
language, and physical assaults.28 But when four months later gay Alabama
textile worker Billy Jack Gaither was beaten to death with an ax handle and his
body sacrificially burned, the outcry was muted. In February of 1999, when
openly gay 17-year-old Adam Colton founded a Gay-Straight Alliance at his
high school in Main County, California, and three teenage males beat him
senseless and carved the word "fag" into his arms and stomach with a ball point
pen, the brutality received little airplay outside of California. 29 It was simply not
(reporting that Emporia State University withdrew sexual orientation from protected class
status in its antidiscrimination policy); Chuck Colbert, Notre Dame Blew It on Discrimination
Policy, 45 NAT'L CATH. REP. 19 (Mar. 26, 1999) (trustees of Notre Dame refused to add sexual
orientation as a protected category under the school's nondiscrimination clause); see also Craig
Garrett, District Drops Gay Policy: Wayne- Westland Schools Delete 'Sexual Onentation 'from
Protected Category, DErRorr Nawis, Aug. 20, 1997, at Cl; Julie Irwin, Court Lets Stand Law
Denying Gay Protection, CIN. ENQUIER, Oct. 14, 1998, at Al; Kristina Johnson, Human
Rights Law Under Fire; Group to Gather Names for Initiative to Remove 'Sexual Orientation',
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Mar. 16, 1999, at Al.
25 See Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1998, at Al.
26 Tanika White, Who's Who Poll Sees Rise in Student Cheating, Bias, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 13, 1998, at Al. The temperature has not changed much since 1992. See Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of
Colorado's Amendment 2, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1057, 1068 (1994) (describing University of
Michigan study in which more than 50% of those surveyed said they felt coldly toward gay
men and lesbians).
27 See Janita Poe, Tension in Classrooms Brings Gay Issues to Fore, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19,
1998, § 1, at 1.
2 8 Lisa Gelhaus, Gay-Bashing Victims Overcome Prejudice to Win Civil Settlements,
TkiAL, Feb. 1999, at 14.
29 See Ireland, supra note 5, at 8; Marisa Samuelson, Support Groups Allow Gay Teens to
Express Fears, TUCSON CrrzEN, Mar. 27, 1999, at IA. This triptych of late 1990s antigay
violence omits the celebrated cases occurring earlier in the decade, such as the story of
Brandon Teena, a 21-year-old anatomical female who lived as a male and dated women in a
rural Nebraska town. Two weeks after town residents discovered his biological sex, two men
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news that a member of an unpopular group was targeted for violence. A recent
Pennsylvania State University study revealed that "80 percent of gay youths
reported having been physically abused, 44 percent faced physical threats, and 17
percent were physically harmed."30 The sad truth is that gay-bashing is not
unusual.
C. The Legal Landscape of "Tolerance"
Perhaps in the larger sweep, over time and globally, legal and cultural
tolerance of gays and lesbians is increasing. But it is a particular kind of
tolerance: not the tolerance of undogmatic, objective acceptance, but of grudging
endurance. It is repressive tolerance. As my friend Sam Marcosson says, it is a
"hold your nose" and tolerate form of acceptance.31 This leaves sexual others
living in a twilight of "virtual equality," villified, shunned, alienated, closeted,
marginalized-far from truly liberated, accepted, or treated as fully equal3 2
Consider the legal dimensions of tolerance. Until 1961, all fifty states
criminalized sodomy; only eighteen do today.33 But in the past two decades, a
handful of states have amended their antisodomy statutes to cover only activity
between same sex partners 34
raped and murdered him. See Rogers Worthington, Deadly Deception: Teena Brandon's
Double Life May Have Led to a T'ple Murder, CI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1994, § 5, at 1.
3 0 Gay High-SchoolerBoosts Tolerance, RICH. TIM-ESDISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1999, at B4.
3 1 See Telephone interview with Sam Marcosson (Spring, 1999). See generally Linda C.
McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond
"Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998). For a recent
example of the point, see Richard Brookhiser, The Gay Moment, NAT'L REV., July 26, 1999, at
42, 43 (cover story proclaiming 'They're here. They're queer. We're used to it." against
caricatured cover art featuring Jar Jar Binks, Tinky Winky, Abraham Lincoln, Ellen Degeneres,
and Oscar Wilde, with text that buys into numerous stereotypes: "Irish, Jews, and gays all have
high verbal skills"; gays "deployed" AIDS as a "self-inflicted... 'suffering situation[]' to
elicit sympathy and induce guilt").
32 URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALrTY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LEsBIAN
LIBERATrON 3-5 (1992).
33 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don t Ask; Don't Tell',
108 YALE LJ. 485,543 n.54 (1998).
34 See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531,538 (1992).
Currently eighteen states have antisodomy laws; in five of those states (Arkansas, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas), the statutes apply only to same sex activity. Kathy Lohr,
Challenging Anti-Sodomy Laws, (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 11, 1999), available in 1999 WL
3000204.
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While hate crime legislation has proliferated rapidly since 1990,35 hate
crime laws include sexual orientation in fewer than half of the states.36 Even in
those states that do protect sexual orientation, what is institutionalized is in many
cases an empty framework that includes underprosecution and accusing
complainants of oversensitivity.37
In the past decade, we have seen an increase in local statutes and ordinances
prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations
on the basis of sexual orientation. Eleven such states38 and over 100 such
municipal ordinances exist today.39 But, the Senate has twice fallen short of the
votes needed to pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act4 0
Three states, 64 cities and counties, 83 colleges and universities, and 476
private companies offer some form of domestic partner benefits.41 But in 1996,
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") by "overwhelming
3 5 See Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified in
part at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)); Valerie L. Brown, Birt-h of Consciousness: Hate Crimes (and
Hate Speech) on Campus-A Review of Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 90 EDUC. L. REP. 979 (1994).
3 6 See NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST., CAPrrAL GAINS & LOSSES:
A STATE BY STATE REVIEW OF LESBIAN, GAY, TRANSGENDER, AND HIVIAIDS-RELATED
LEGISLATION IN 1997, at 2, 56 (1997) (listing 21 states).
37 See Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against Hate Crime: Movement at a
Crossroads, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564,566-67 (1998).
3 8 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81c
(West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 368-1, 378-2 (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 5472 (West 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3.548(102), 37.2103(3) (Callaghan 1996); Mmin. STAT. §§ 363.03, 363.12 (1996);
N.J REV. STAT. §§ 10:2-1, 10:5-4, 10:5-12 (1996); RI. GEN. LAws § 28-5-7 (1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 495 (1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(1) (West 1997); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2512 (1997); see also James P. Baker, Equal Benefits for Equal Work? The Law of
Domestic Partner Benefits, 14 LAB. LAW. 23,26 n.11 (1998).
3 9 See Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local Laws on Domestic
Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ.
267,278 n.29 (1998).
40 See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, H.R. 1858, 105th Cong.
(1997); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); 142
CONG. REC. D912 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (Senate rejected by one vote).
41 See Paul L. Spackman, Note & Comment, Grant v. South-West Trains: Equality for
Same-Sex Partners in the European Community, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063, 1064
n.2 (1997) (noting that "only 428 companies in the United States ... provide domestic partner
benefits and that for every company providing benefits there are at least twenty companies in
which gay and lesbian employees are asking for these benefits"); Human Rights Campaign,
WorkNet Employer Database, (last modified Mar. 20, 2000) <http'J/hrc.org/issues/workplac/
dp/dplist.html> (listing 2,933 employers that offer domestic partner health benefits).
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majorities of both houses of Congress."42 Over half the states have adopted local
versions of the DOMA, while Attorneys General's opinions accomplish the same
result in a handful of additional states.
43
What is evolving in the way of protection for sexual others is a legal regime
of bone-tossing. You have domestic partner benefits, you do not need (or
deserve) marriage. You cannot be prosecuted for sodomy in 32 states, but you
cannot talk about your intimate partner in any state or you will not be able to
serve in the military. Large areas of formal inequality remain entrenched-, in forty
states employers have the ability to fire workers simply for being gay;44 in
housing, in access to public services, parenting rights, inheritance, immigration,
and tax benefits, gay unions are denied equality; the ban on same sex marriage
not only denies tangible economic consequences, but a host of intangible and
symbolic cultural benefits that flow from marriage.
One reading of the Supreme Court's gay and lesbian jurisprudence is that the
Court has countenanced a patchwork of hate-based indifference. If Cincinnati
wants to prohibit "special privileges" or "preferential treatment" for the
ostensible government purpose of conserving costs that would be expended in
investigating and trying discrimination cases, Cincinnati can do that, as long as
Cincinnati does not act purely from discriminatory "animus." 45 We call this the
laboratory of the states, and we reassure ourselves that because of it, democracy
is working.
This is a legally enforced regime of tolerance that tames differences, quiets
political action, makes secrecy compulsory, condones stigma, and ultimately
entrenches inequality.46 One of the greatest legal Challenges for sexual others is
to confront this institutionalization of second class citizenship. 47
42 Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional
Recognition ofNon-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 150 (1998).
43 See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265,296-98 (1999).
44 Only ten states and the D.C. ban discrimination based on sexual orientation. See
William B. Rubenstein, In Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar,
48 HASTNGS Li. 1101, 1105 (1997).
45 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 298-
301 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998). I believe in a somewhat less cynical or
at least more optimistic interpretation. See infra text at notes 159-60.
46 See Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81,
81 (R Wolff et al. eds., 1965) ("[W]hat is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today is in
many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression").
4 7 See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1883 (1997); Eloise Salholz et al.,
For Better or for Worse, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1993, at 69 (according to gay rights advocate
Thomas B. Stoddard, "'[d]omestic partnership is, for better or worse, second-class
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D. Law and Cultural Re-Presentation: Coercing Invisibility
It is not easy to show a direct causal relation between the silencing
techniques of law and the cultural silencing of these facets of identity, but
consider the evidence. Surely, it is not accidental that the law says lesbians and
gays cannot marry, adopt or become foster parents48 and that mainstream
television and movies contain virtually no portrayal of gay and lesbian parenting
or family life. It is more than coincidence that the United States government's
"don't ask, don't tell" policy prohibits knowing or divulging sexual orientation
and that schools silence gay and lesbian student groups, and attempt to ban any
materials or discussion of homosexuality in school curricula.49
Government's failure to protect gays and lesbians from violence and from
employment discrimination is certainly not unrelated to the cultural code of
silence that pressures nonstraights "to stay silent about significant aspects of their
personal or family lives."50 Ultimately this may lead to self-silencing. Each year
gay youths constitute up to 30% of successful teenage suicides: "Suicide may be
a way of making sure that no one ever knows:' 51
At times the legal and the cultural are inextricable: the refusals to allow gay
pride marchers the right to march in St. Patrick's Day parades impinges not only
on the rights of sexual others, but also their practical ability to culturally
citizenship").
48 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4,
170-F:6 (1994); In re Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) ("It would be anomalous for the state on the one hand to declare homosexual
conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent after that proscribed model").
49 See Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and Dangerous Things, 106 YALE L.J.
2661, 2669 (1997) (book review) ("With the exception of sodomy and solicitation cases in
criminal law and a few recent constitutional law cases, gay men and lesbians remain invisible
in courses other than those that are explicitly dedicated to sexual orientation and the law.');
Nancy Tenney, The Constitutional Imperative ofReality in Public School Curricula: Untruths
About Homosexuality as a Violation of the First Amendment, 60 BROoK. L. REV. 1599, 1642-
46 (1995) (citing state statutes requiring that sex education in schools discourage
homosexuality); Carolyn Moreau, Coming Out of the Closet: &hools Address Homosexuality,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 1996, at Al (school boards across the countly have taken
"dramatic actions to keep discussions of homosexuality out of schools"); see also Cara
DeGette, Students Lose Bid for Gay Club at School, DENVER POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at B03;
Kristen Moulton, Dispute over Gay Group Costs School, DALLAs MORNING NEVS, Dec. 11,
1998, at 56A.
50 Jennifer Durkin, Queer Studies I: An Examination of the First Eleven Studies of Sexual
Orientation Bias by the Legal Profession, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 343,364 (1998).
51 Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy That Gay
and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269, 271 (1996) (quoting
University of Minnesota pediatrician Gary Remafedi).
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constitute a group identity.52
Law and cultural representations work together to create meaning. Law
reflects social forces, but it also shapes them.53 In the absence of legal regulation,
negative cultural representations have more room to flourish. Proactively, laws
send cultural messages; they give pernission.54 The effects of this permission are
apparent in statistics that show antigay violence "is escalating more than any
other category of hate crime' 55 and in the visible incarnations of the hatred, such
as the killing of Matthew Shepard and Billy Jack Gaither and the beating and
carving of Adam Colton.
In the past decade, legal theorists have struggled to change laws and
doctrines that prevent sexual minorities from achieving equality. They have done
so with varying degrees of sensitivity to the cultural reception of their arguments.
IR. GAY LEGAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
In seeking acceptance by mainstream culture, many gay legal theorists seem
to divide between what I term an outsider or antisubordination strategy and a
formal equality model. Although the paths of equality and outsider theorists are
not exclusive, outsiders use a variety of theoretical devices to challenge
prevailing models of heterosexuality as the norm, and more broadly to
destabilize traditional understandings of sex, gender roles, and sexual orientation.
They graphically depict the ways in which sexual nonconformists have been
constructed as sexual deviants in the hopes that revealing this artificial social and
52 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 559 (1995) (upholding the exclusion of Irish gay pride group from privately sponsored St.
Patrick's Day Parade); William N. Eskzidge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out". Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions ofLibenly and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.
2411, 2457-58 (1997) (noting that although the Supreme Court saw Hurley as a First
Amendment case, it was litigated in state court as a public accommodations case; and
commenting, "Doctrinally, the queerest feature of the opinion is the way the Court's governing
precedent, Roberts, disappeared into a legal closet").
53 See, eg., R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE LJ. 875, 960 (1998) ("[L]aw
shapes social practices even as it takes account of them:"); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts
and the Cultural Performance: Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to
Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1994) ("[C]ourts in important instances not only decide
disputes, they also transform particular legal controversies and rights claims into larger public
messages.').
54 Cf COMER VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 81-82 (3d rev.
ed. 1974) (describing Plessy v. Ferguson and other similar decisions as "permission to hate"
signals from the Supreme Court).
55 Paul Beeman, PFL4G President's Statement for Matthew Shepard Candlelight Vigil
Oast modified Oct. 14, 1998) <http://www.pflag.org/press/releasem.html>.
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legal construction of norms and deviance will develop understanding of and
tolerance for sexual outsiders.
Other gay legal theorists have devoted more energy toward demonstrating
the ways in which sexual outsiders look very much like the "ideal model"-the
heterosexual norm-as loving parents, and caring, committed partners. Equality
theorists accept for the most part the given identity categories of homosexuals
and heterosexuals, but try to show that sexual differences should not make a
difference, socially or legally. Equality theorists may be agnostic on the issue or
even question whether the heterosexual norm is truly an ideal, but they accept it
as the paradigm cultural model. Equality-seeking political activists must be
prepared to argue that to the extent an ideal model of family life exists, gays and
lesbians conform to that snapshot. Thus, equality theory does not depend on
acceptance of the model as an ideal, but equality seeking, as a practical matter,
does.
Conflicts between equality and outsider theorists are revealed most starkly in
literature on military service and marriage.5 6 Equality theorists seek official
recognition of their unions in the hopes that this assimilationist strategy will
develop understanding and tolerance and ultimately dismantle the idea of a
despised, less worthy sexual "other." These are often not exclusive goals-and a
single theorist may employ both strategies-but the objectives certainly entail
differences in emphasis and focus.
A. Outsider Strategies
The initial outsider strategy challenged both the norm and the presumed
superiority of heterosexuality. The early writings of Adrienne Rich questioned
the existence of a sharp dichotomy between heterosexuality and homosexuality,
offering instead her idea of a "lesbian continuum."57 In Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, Rich argued that women bond with other
women in many ways, giving each other meaningful and intimate social and
political support through talks, work, and shared child care, motherhood,
sisterhood, romantic friendships, and sometimes sexual intimacy. She also
questioned the institution of marriage, the traditional hallmark of heterosexual
unions, revealing its darker side for women: "motherhood as unpaid
production... prescriptions for 'full-time' mothering [at home]; enforced
economic dependence of wives; ... [and] restriction of female self-fulfillment to
marriage and motherhood," and its doubled workload for women and its sexual
56 See infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 75-79.
57 See Adrienne Cecile Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE
SIGNS READER: WOMEN, GENDER & SCHOLARSHP 139, 139-68 (Elizabeth Abel & Emily K.
Abel eds., 1983).
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division of labor.58
Later theorists joined the project to destabilize heteronormativity. They
explain the ways in which cultures, courts, and theorists have conflated the
meanings of sex, gender, and sexual orientation.59 They have searched for new
"linguistic and conceptual tools to talk about sexual difference." 60 One technique
was to reclaim the word "queer," transform it into a nonderogatory term, and
make it a symbol of resistance and activism.61 Another political tactic developed
in the 1990s was "outing"-exposing the sexual orientation of closeted gays and
lesbians and forcing them out of the closet 62 Some criticized the institution of
marriage itself, charging that it reinforced a variety of gender and familial
hierarchies. 63
These challenges to the norm of heterosexual unions extended to the
development of specific doctrinal suggestions, such as premarital security
agreements, which "could queer legal doctrine regulating marriage."64 The
destabilization project of outsider theory contrasts with the stability that equality
theory gives to heterosexual unions-they are the foundational norm on which
comparisons and claims of equal rights are based. The rhetoric of
antisubordinationists is that of liberation, and they believe that only radical
challenges to traditional norms will ever transform America into a truly plural
democracy.65
58 Id. at 147.
59 See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LJ. 1, 9-18 (1995);
Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sexffrom Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 63-64 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
60 LISA DUGGAN, Queering the State, in SEx WARS: SExuAL DISSENT AND PoLITIcAL
CULTURE 179, 192 (1995).
6 1 See MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLMCS AND SOCIAL
THEORY xxi-xxv (1993); Valdes, supra note 59, at 346-50.
62 See David Gelman, 'Outing'. An Unexpected Assault on Sexual Privacy: Gay Activists
Are Forcing Others Out of the Closet, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 1990, at 66; William A. Henry M11,
To "Out" orNot to "Out,"TIME, Aug. 19,1991, at 17.
63 See, eg., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMrfMENrS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20 (Suzanne
Sherman ed., 1992); Nancy D. Polikoff We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1539-40 (1993).
64 Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXonal Approach, 75 DENY.
U. L. REV. 1215, 1219 (1998).
65 See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 63, at 1536 ("Tlhe desire to marry in the lesbian and gay
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Queer theorists demonstrated the constructed nature of sexual identity and
consistently rejected a sharp opposition between heterosexuality and
homosexuality.6 6 Sexuality exists on a continuum and this blurs the lines
between the categories of heterosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, and
homosexuals. The destabilization project was intended to strip heterosexuality of
its "naturalized status" and its artificial superiority.67 If heterosexuality was
simply not 'natural," homosexuality would no longer be a chosen form of
perversion.
A number of outsider theorists boldly and eloquently emphasize the
distinctiveness of being a sexual "other." Frank Valdes, for example, urges gays
to engage in "sex talk," forthright expression of same-sex desire, as "a key to self
development and community formation; ... a means of expressing our
selves... [and] of altering the dominant culture's political and legal
misconceptions of lesbians and gays."68 Other theorists have explained that the
process of "coming out," or publicly revealing their sexual orientation, is one
with personal, social, and political significance: it not only shapes individual
identity, but may help create a political community.69
Outsider scholarship, particularly the experiential narratives of oppressed
groups, have provoked considerable debate in academic circles about the
traditional stories law tells and the points of view that have been excluded.70 The
community is an attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an
inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation
and radical feminism.").
66 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExUALnTY: AN INIRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (explaining why certain forms of discourse have taken shape in
the West during the last three centuries); DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
HoMosExUALrIY (1988); Daniel R Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and
Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (1993).
67 Ertman, supra note 64, at 1219.
68 Francisco Valdes, Acts ofPower, Crimes ofKnowledge: Some Observations on Desire,
Law and Ideology in the Politics of Expression at the End of the Twentieth Century, I J.
GENDER, RACE& JUST. 213,215 (1997).
69 See Eskridge, supra note 52, at 2440; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating
Outness: Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 89,
117(1998).
70 See generally Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994)
(focusing on the resistance to legal storytelling); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MCH. L. REV. 2411, 2415 (1989)
(examining "the use of stories in the struggle for racial reform"); William N. Eslaidge, Jr.,
Gaylegalarratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 608 (1994) (explaining that "outsider" scholarship
challenges the law's agenda, assumptions, and biases); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility,
Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. LJ. 1845
(1994) (exploring the existence of pre-understanding in the outsider narrative context); Daniel
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stories also seem to be effective in slowly changing cultural perceptions about
sexual others.7 1 In the absence of mainstream political support, however, the
narrative methodologies of gay legal theorists have been successful only
sporadically in prompting judicial and legislative changes.72
B. Formal Equality Strategies
Although these camps are not exclusive, other gay legal theorists frame their
principal objective as the attainment of formal equality with heterosexuals or
opposite-sex couples. As William Eskridge capsulized, "Essential to [ending all
vestiges of legal discrimination] is the adoption of laws guaranteeing equal rights
for lesbian and gay couples. 73 Many equality theorists believe that
normalization of homosexuality can itself be transformative.74
Andrew Sullivan, for example, while questioning the public, legislative
aspects of a civil rights model, argues strongly in favor of legal recognition of
same-sex marriages: "If nothing else were done at all, and gay marriage were
legalized, ninety percent of the political work necessary to achieve gay and
lesbian equality would have been achieved. It is ultimately the only reform that
matters.'75 The title of Sullivan's book, Virtually Normal: An Argument About
Homosexuality, implies the comparison to the heterosexual norm.
The form of argument remained the same with respect to marriage rights,
access to military service, employment benefits and protections, and child
custody. These laws deprived gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of equal rights to
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (provoking thought on the appropriate role of storytelling in legal
scholarship).
7 1 See, eg., David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSrA L.
REV. 53, 77 (1997).
72 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet:
Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981,
25 HOFSRA L. REV. 817, 943 (1997) (describing the difficulties of legislative lobbying for
same sex marriage rights in the 1970s); see also Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of
Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1998) (analyzing Congress's use of narratives to justify DOMA).
7 3 WnIM N. EsKRiDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTYTO CIVII= COMM11MENT 10 (1996).
74 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A
Marketplace Innovation and a Less Than Pefect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ.
RTS. L. REv. 337,349 n.56 (1998).
7 5 ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENr ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY
181-85 (1995).
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minimal, fundamental protections enjoyed by all other citizens.76 Some equality
theorists claimed that denial of these protections was discrimination based on
sexual orientation (which ought to be a protected status category); others
maintained that these exclusions were sex discrimination.77
The battle was relentlessly uphill, with plaintiffs marshalling what empirical,
narrative, logical, and moral arguments they could to demonstrate that
homosexuals were no different than heterosexuals in any relevant way and were
thus worthy of similar entitlements.
The arguments of the equality theorists centered on demonstrating the
circularity of reasoning among those opposing same-sex unions (marriage is
definitionally restricted to opposite-sex couples), the fundamental nature of the
right to marriage, and the lack of a compelling state interest in prohibiting same-
sex marriages. 7s The equality theorists want not only the considerable material
benefits from state sanction of their unions, but also the symbolic and declarative
recognition that it brings.79 Some are willing to engage in the difficult line-
drawing that equality theory demands. William Eskridge, for example, accepts
that distinctions can be drawn between committed partnerships and multiple
relationships.8 0
Formal equality theory seemed sensible, particularly in light of poll data
showing that a majority of Americans supported equal rights for homosexuals, at
least in the workplace.81 Yet reliance on popular impulses toward equal rights
76 See Maria J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay
Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 183,238-39
(1995); Diane H. Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be
Admitted to the Military Even If Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIo ST. L.. 953, 963-70 (1997);
Julia F. Davies, Note, Two Mons and a Baby: Protecting the Nontraditional Family Through
Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1055, 1060-64 (1995).
77 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay
Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against
gays and lesbians oppresses women); Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Ttle V11, 81 GEo. LJ. 1 (1992)
(explaining why Title VII bars discrimination against homosexuals).
7 8 See, e.g., Christine jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 461,
464--66 (1995).
79 See Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE: PRIVATE COMMITMENTS, PuBLIc CEREMONIES, supra note 63, at 13,14-
19. See generally Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians
and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567
(1994-1995) (addressing opposition from homosexuals to the fight for marriage rights).
80 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Three Cultural Anxieties Undermining the Case for
Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TeM. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 307,313 (1998).
81 See The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 1996: Hearings on H.R. 1863 Before
[Vol. 61:867
A DIFFERENTKTND OF SAMENESS
possessed Orwellian limitations. In the view of the general public, some rights
were more equal than others, and more than half of all Americans opposed same
sex marriage and adoption rights.82
It was not the heart of equality theory-requests for the same constitutional
rights enjoyed by all other citizens-that was problematic, but the interpretation.
The approach requires a comparison between sexual others and some idealized
heterosexual norm. The implementation of this comparison by courts and
legislatures was perhaps less formalist and more "normalist": they abandoned
equality theory precisely at the moment that a genuine egalitarian attitude was
most needed. Equality theory succumbed to a normalist decisional approach-
too willing to accept the received wisdom as a justification for inequality,8 3 and
too ready to be persuaded that departures from the norm are harmful and may be
punished by unequal treatment.8 4
Claims for equal rights were met in the political arena with charges that
sexual minorities sought "special protection," a favored status based on their
sexual preferences. The "special rights" rhetoric was behind several successful
campaigns to repeal antidiscrimination ordinances.85 It was part as Jane
Schacter noted, of a "discourse of equivalents" that compared homosexuals to
heterosexuals and sexual orientation to other protected categories such as race,
gender, and religion 8 6 Gay rights opponents thus denied discrimination by
claiming that gay men and lesbians were affluent, well educated, and politically
the Subcomm. on Government Programs of the House Comm. on Small Businesses, 104th
Cong. 42 (1996) (statement of Elizabeth Birch) (citing Human Rights Campaign polls finding
that 74% of all Americans supported equal employment rights for homosexuals); Mark
Gillespie, Americans Support Hate Crimes Legislation That Protects Gays Oast modified Apr.
7, 1999) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990407.asp> (issuing results of a February
1999 Gallup poll in which "83% of Americans said gay men and women should have equal
rights in the workplace").
82 See Tom Morganthau, Baptists vs. Mickey: Why the Boycott Against Disney Faces
Steep Odds, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1997, at 51 (citing a Newsweek poll showing "that the
public still opposes gay marriage (56 to 35 percent) and adoption (49 to 40 percent)").
83 See infra text accompanying notes 116-17 (regarding acceptance of military cohesion
rationales for excluding known homosexuals from military service).
84 See infra text accompanying note 194 (regarding courts depriving gay and lesbian
parents of child custody because their choices of sexual partners differed from the norm).
85 The proponents of Colorado's Amendment No. 2 developed bumper stickers
proclaiming "Equal rights, not special rights:' Jeffiey Rosen, Disoriented, NEW REPUBUIC, Oct.
23, 1995, at 24. See generally Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the
Debate over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NoTRE DAiE J.L. ETmcs & PuB. POL'Y 137
(1995) (dissecting what "special rights" means and giving answers to the "special rights"
argument).
86 Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283,285 (1994).
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powerful. The equal rights rhetoric compelled what Schacter calls a "misguided
search for sameness," a need to fit discrimination against sexual others into a
rigid template established by gender and race cases, when the actual
phenomenology and patterns of discrimination against homosexuals differed
markedly from those of other disempowered groups. 8 7
C. Theoretical and Practical Limits ofFormal Equality and Outsider
Strategies
Equality thinkers and outsider advocates have reached a theoretical
stalemate regarding identity, assimilation, and the social construction of
differences. Equality theorists believe that by emphasizing the ways
homosexuals resemble heterosexuals, sexual minorities will get into the room to
begin transformation of cultural beliefs. Their strategy is integration first,
recognition of differences later. Outsiders believe that true acceptance
necessitates acceptance of differences, and that an initial acknowledgement of
differences between heterosexuals and sexual minorities is vital. The integration
they seek is "integration of the public and private lives of gay men and lesbians,
not simply integration into society."'88 This debate about the best way to achieve
equality is reminiscent of the sameness-difference debate in feminist circles and
the integrationaist-segregationist dispute in critical race theory s9 This Section
will discuss the theoretical flaws of both equality and outsider theories. It also
examines the practical reception of both theories by courts and the popular
media.
1. The Assimilation Critique ofFormal Equality Theory
Outsider theorists have a variety of objections to any strategy that seeks to
show sameness to obtain equality. One primary concern centers on the idea that
if sexual others try to show the same entitlement to rights as straights, they will
87 See id. at 299.
88 Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity Implications
ofSame-Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353, 355 (1999).
89 See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1426 (1997); Bill Ong -ing,
Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of
Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 863,
894-98 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALiF. L. REV. 1401, 1436-38 (1993);
Donna Thompson-Schneider, The Arc of History: Or, the Resurrection of Feminism's
Sameness/Difference Dichotomy in the Gay and Lesbian Marriage Debate, 7 LAW & SEX. 1,
7-14(1997).
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be forced to hide their unique or distinctive traits. Kenji Yoshino is concerned
that the current equal protection model forces assimilation by requiring outsider
groups to establish their similarities to race and sex.90 This, says Yoshino,
"encourage[s outsiders] to assimilate by changing or hiding their defining
characteristic."9 1 Robin West argues the point as a matter of opportunity costs:
When we fail to acknowledge salient differences between lesbianism and
heterosexuality and between gay life and straight life, we entirely lose on the
opportunity to glean moral insights from the experiences of the former... [A]n
embrace of gay and lesbian sexual practices may prompt a re-invigorated critical
examination of-and hence improvement upon-heterosexual norms,
institutions, and practices, and the moral sense to which those experiences
arguably give rise.92
Some outsider theorists fear that a challenge from the inside will never
transform the patriarchal nature of society's most prominent institutions. These
theorists think that an equality-based model represents a wholesale acceptance of
the culture's heterosexual history, traditions, and values.93
Other scholars are concerned that arguments based on sameness will work, if
at all, only for those gays and lesbians who most closely approximate the
mainstream heterosexual model. For other sexual minorities, "[t]hose who live at
the intersection of persistent racism, sexism, poverty," equalizing strategies will
never gain them acceptance and put them at risk of greater marginalization.94
Poor, nonwhite committed monogamous gay couples will not be treated like
upper middle class white committed monogamous gay couples. Since
mainstreaming will work selectively, at best, to the extent that an equality
strategy relies on a heterosexual ideal, it risks polarizing and destroying a sense
of community among sexual minorities.
Several theorists have even argued that an equality model is most likely to
provoke a backlash. As the media in the 1990s was filled increasingly with
stories "portraying gays and lesbians as normal people who serve in the military,
raise children, and live in stable relationships.... this narrative created a breach
90 Yoshino, supra note 33, at 487.
9 1 Id.
92 Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin 's Freedom's
Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1313, 1329 (1997).
93 See Polikoff, supra note 63, at 1549-50.
94 Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some
Thoughts on the Campaignfor Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 319,
325 (1998) ("What will result is a gay version of the 'Huxtable Family Syndrome,' where the
social acceptance promised by civil rights reforms is available only to those who are
sufficiently 'just like' those currently occupying the mainstream.").
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
in society's generally accepted sense of order."95 According to Jack Balkin, the
less gays and lesbians look like outcasts and the more they resemble members of
the mainstream, the more dominant groups will fight to preserve the existing
status hierarchy.96
2. Formal Equality in the Courts
Some of the theoretical concerns regarding equality theory played out in
practice, particularly the concern that if heterosexuals were the touchstone of the
equality model, the differences of sexual identity would be overlooked. Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,97 although a case of statutory construction of
Title VII, was essentially a victory for formal equality theory. It is also a good
example of the limitations of the equal rights model. Joseph Oncale's complaint
arose from repeated and persistent sexual taunts, physical assaults, and threats of
rape by his immediate supervisors and two coworkers. During one of these
incidents, his supervisor restrained Oncale while one of his coworkers forced a
bar of soap into his anus.98 Oncale testified that he ultimately was forced to quit
his job because he believed that "if I didn't leave my job, I would be raped or
forced to have sex."99
In a relatively brief opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that workers
could sue for same-sex sexual harassment. Scalia, however, kept the case firmly
grounded in an antisex discrimination equal rights framework: "The critical
issue, Title VII's test indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed."'100 The formal equality framework compares the
treatment of persons in the category of males with the treatment of persons in the
95 Butler, supra note 72, at 861-62.
96 See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE LJ. 2313,2337 (1997).
Any departure from a baseline that views homosexuality as deviant and immoral will
be viewed by some members of the dominant status group eager to retain their status as a
movement toward treating homosexuality as normal and morally appropriate.
In this zero-sum world, tolerance for homosexuals can be reconciled with their lower
social status only so long as this tolerance is given grudgingly and without any social or
moral approval of homosexuality.
l. at 2336-37.
97 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
98 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996).
99 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
100 Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
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category of females. This, of course, omits potential plaintiffs who do not fit
neatly into the categories, such as bisexuals or transsexuals.10 It also omits
perpetrators who engage in sexually offensive conduct that affects the terms and
conditions of the plaintiff's employment, but who do not differentiate neatly
between the categories of males and females.
The Court's emphasis that harassment must be "because of sex," and its
requirement that one sex must suffer disadvantages that the other does not, may
be read to leave open a curious defense that undermines the purposes of Title
VII. The victim of an "equal opportunity" harasser, one who harasses both
women and men, would be unable to demonstrate differential treatment
compared to members of the other sex. Several insensitive lower courts have
read Oncale this way and have concluded that the victim of a harasser who
targets both sexes equally cannot establish a claim. 102 Other courts have quite
rightly recognized that if gender supplies the motive and defines the content of
the harassment-if it is a gendered assault in form and substance-then it is
counterintuitive to conclude no gender discrimination exists simply because the
perpetrator has harassed both male and female victims.10 3 The Oncale Court
omitted consideration of the equal opportunity harasser other than the oblique
line that "[a] same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace." 104 The lower courts are split regarding whether
an equal opportunity harasser can escape Title VII liability. 105
Oncale's consideration of male-on-male harassment using the heterosexual
101 See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Ulane
is entitled to any personal belief about her sexual identity she desires. After the surgery,
hormones, appearance changes, and a new Illinois birth certificate and FAA pilot's certificate,
it may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane to be female. But even if one
believes that a woman can be so easily created from what remains of a man, that does not
decide this case .... Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against transsexuals.").
102 See, ag., Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915-16 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Romero
v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190, 193 (D.P.R. 1998).
103 See, ag., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993).
104 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
105 Compare, ag., McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 260 ("It would be exceedingly perverse if a
male worker could buy his supervisors and his company immunity from Title VII liability by
taking care to harass sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were
female."), with Butler v. Ysleta Indep. School Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 270 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the defendant's "sending of offensive materials to both men and women is evidence that
the workplace itself, while perhaps more sexually charged than necessary, was not sexually
charged in a way that made it a hostile environment for either men or women").
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ideal may seriously constrain the possibilities for using Title VII doctrine to
challenge sexual stereotyping. The Court was presented with the issue of whether
Oncale was targeted for abuse because of intrasexual stereotyping because
Joseph Oncale was a small man who did not "conform to traditional norms of
masculinity." 10 6 The Court, however, refused to consider whether sexual
harassment law prohibits conduct that reinforces sexual stereotypes. Justice
Scalia seemed determined to avoid questions of whether workplace norms
subordinate sexual others or privilege definitions of masculinity that themselves
create hierarchies. The effeminate man or masculine woman who is harassed
because he or she does not conform to the ideal of his or her gender may be
without a remedy.107
The failures of an idealized model are also seen in the ways they reinforce
traditional gender norms and biases. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion is laden
with language that resonates with the cultural norms of both heterosexuality and
traditional gender behaviors. The Oncale majority went further than implicitly
assuming that most male perpetrators of sexual harassment are heterosexual.
Justice Scalia explicitly assumes the abnormality of any sexual overtures other
than between members of the opposite sex: "Courts and juries have found the
inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment
situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit
proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not
have been made to someone of the same sex."I08 This heterocentrist model
abnormalizes voluntary homosexual, bisexual, or transgendered sexual
encounters.
Since the comparative populations in a formal equality model-the
"opposite" sexes-are built on traditional understandings, actionable conduct
106 See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-568); see also Katherine
M. Franke, What's Wrong with SexualHarassmnent?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997).
By regarding each member of a sexual group as a fungible representative of the class of
subordinators or subordinated, it eliminates the possibility that men could discriminate
against other men, through harassment or other means, because the latter fail to live up to
the societal expectations of 'proper' masculinity, or that women could engage in the same
or similar behavior toward other women who fail to embody a particular standard of
femininity.
Id at 755.
107 See, e.g., Garrity v. Nationsbank of Texas, NA., No. CIV. 3:98CV0437-H, 1999 WL
76785, at *6 n.6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999) (holding explicitly that Title VII affords no cause of
action for sexual stereotyping).
108 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; see also Jennifer Ann Drobac, Pansexuality and the Law,
5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &L. 297,304 (1999).
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may be defined and similarly constrained by the current behaviors of those
populations. Justice Scalia's careful exposition in Oncale of what sexual
harassment is not attests to this limitation. Dicta in the opinion offers
considerable support for traditional gender role stereotypes. Courts and juries,
Scalia emphasizes, should "not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace"
for discrimination. 10 9 Ordinary socializing, he explains, consists of behaviors
"such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation" and "simple teasing or
roughhousing among members of the same sex."110 Indeed, the definition of
what is sufficiently hostile or abusive conduct will remain mired in traditional
gender norms because Title VII "does not reach genuine but innocuous
differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the
same sex and of the opposite sex." lI1
The limitation of using a formal equality model for legal decisions that
address issues affecting the gay community is not just that frailties of
heterosexual relationships, such as traditional gender norms or divisions of labor,
will be imported. The concern is that the equality model cannot begin to
comprehend the subtleties of sex and gender stereotyping, the variations among
sexual others, and the abuses along dimensions of power that are unredressable
under current law. Oncale illustrates that, even in the midst of a victory, sirict
equality theory fails to recognize important differences between sexual
majorities and minorities and fails to challenge gender stereotypes.
The military exclusion cases illuminate the other side of the coin. The mirror
difficulty with the equality theory is that differences that are recognized are those
that the dominant culture uses as measures of condemnation; Able v. United
States1 12 demonstrates this point In Able, a group of gay and lesbian service
members filed suit to challenge the "don't ask, don't tell"'I13 policy as violative
of the First Amendment equal protection, and substantive due process. In a long
109 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
110 Id at 81-82.
11! Id at 81. See, ag., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
Most unfortunately, expressions such as 'fuck me,' 'kiss my ass,' and 'suck my dick,' are
commonplace in certain circles, and more often than not when these expressions are used
(particularly when uttered by men to other men), their use has no connection whatsoever
with the sexual acts to which they make reference-even when they are accompanied, as
they sometimes were here, with a crotch-grabbing gesture.
Id at 412.
112 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.).N.Y. 1997).
113 National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654(bXl)
(1994) (setting forth what has been referred to as the military's "don't ask, don't tell" approach
to gays in the military).
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and thoughifil opinion tracing the history of prejudice against homosexuals, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York found that "the
Act discriminates against homosexuals in order to cater to the prejudices of
heterosexuals" and held that the statute "imposed unequal conditions on
homosexuals as a prerequisite to serving their country in the armed forces." I 14
The Second Circuit reversed the district court 115 Applying the rational basis
test because no suspect or quasi-suspect classification was at issue and because
the regulation was "based on conduct, not status," the court of appeals supported
the differential treatment of homosexuals and heterosexuals. 116 The court noted a
strong presumption of deference to Congress in military matters, and then
accepted the government's justifications-promoting unit cohesion, protecting
privacy of gays, and reducing sexual tension-with little reflection. Responding
to the argument that these justifications are merely euphemisms for prejudice
against homosexuals, the court again retreated behind the military shield, stating
that the military needed "to foster 'instinctive obedience, unity, commitment and
esprit de corps."' 1 17 The court of appeals made it a point to note that the
government "can treat persons differently if they are not 'similarly situated."' 118
The Second Circuit never stated precisely how homosexuals and
heterosexuals differ in ways that should matter for military service. Instead the
court inferred that the two groups were not the same. What made the situation of
homosexuals dissimilar to that of heterosexuals was nothing in their individual or
personal qualities. It was the social constructions that attached to the identity
characteristic that distinguished the two groups. The Able court concluded that it
was not irrational for Congress to find that "[t]he presence in the armed forces of
persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."1 19
The court's reference to "unit cohesion" was presumably based on the idea that
the known presence of homosexuals might be disruptive because it could offend
some heterosexuals who disapprove of homosexuality.120 The idea that the
114 SeeAble, 968 F. Supp. at 865.
115 Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998).
116 Id at 632.
117 Id. at 634.
118 Id. at 631. It may be argued that the appellate court decision in Able did not result
from flaws in the equality model, but from intellectual laziness (seen in its deference to the
military and its formulaic application of the rational basis test) that kept it from seriously
considering similarities or differences. But the Able court plainly adopted the equality model
and then summarily rejected the idea that homosexuals are at all similar to heterosexuals.
119 Id. at 636.
12 0 See Able, 968 F. Supp. at 858.
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presence of homosexuals might undermine the military mission again relates to
the political polarization over the issue, rather than any qualities homosexual
service members possess.121 Implicit in the appellate decision was the idea that
homosexuals are different, but different not in personal qualities, only different
in the ways they are perceived by people around them.
The military exclusion cases point to the way equality theory, in the hands of
an unsympathetic appellate court, fails in one final respect. The categorical
differences on which equality theory rests are based on identity characteristics
that are matters of constructed oppositions. Elvia Arriola explains, "As long as
homosexuality is characterized in opposition to, and deviating from, the standard
of heterosexuality, it remains a 'difference' which neither merits nor receives an
equality based analysis. '122 The appellate court in Able found that homosexuals
and heterosexuals were not similarly situated. They were not dissimilar with
respect to any immutable identity characteristics either group possessed, but with
respect to traits constructed by culture: the popular perception of gays as perverse
and immoral.
3. Outsider Theory: Dominant Misunderstandings
While extraordinarily useful in provoking academic debate and deepening
intellectual understanding about lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual
experiences, 123 outsider theories have been notoriously unsuccessful in court.
One strategy advocated by gay legal theorists and urged by litigators was
that homosexuals should be viewed as a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal
121 The appellate court cited testimony of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf to make the
point: .'[i]n my years of military service, I have experienced the fact that the introduction of an
open homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit and destroys the very
bonding that is so important for the unit's survival in time ofwar."'Able, 155 F.3d at 635.
122 Elvia R. Arriola, Gendered Inequality: Lesbians, Gays, and Feminist Legal Theory, 9
BERKE.EY WOMEN'S LJ. 103, 117 (1994).
123 See, e.g., Mark Blasius, Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
Theories, and Their Politics, 8 J. HIST. SEXUALrTY 642 (1998); Richard R. Comwall, A Primer
on Queer Theory for Economists Interested in Social Identiies, 4 FEMINIST ECONOMICS 73
(1998); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511
(1992); Joshua Garnson, Must ldentity Movements Self-Destruct-A Queer Dilemma, 42 SOC.
PROBLES 390 (1995); J. K. Gibson-Graham, Queer(y)ing Capitalism in and out of the
Classroom, 23 J. GEOGRAPHY HIGHER EDuc. 80 (Mar. 1999); Shane Phelan, The Shape of
Queer: Assimilation and Articulation, 18 WOMEN & POLrncS 55 (1997); Ruthann Robson,
Beginning from (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer Narratives, 48 HASTINGS
LJ. 1387 (1997); Jacinth Samuels, Dangerous Liaisons: Queer Subjectivity, Liberalism and
Race, 13 CULTuRAL STUD. 91 (Jan. 1999).
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protection purposes. 124 Despite arguments that gays were being subjected to
differential treatment based on their status, many courts determined that the class
of homosexuals was defined by conduct, and that the activity that defined
homosexuality"-sodomy-was not a constitutionally protected activity 125 Other
courts reasoned that gays and lesbians did not share the traditional suspect class
factors; homosexuality was not immutable, homosexuals were not a discrete or
insular group, and homosexuals-as a class-were not far enough outside the
protection of the laws to be considered a suspect class.126 Ultimately the courts
have ruled almost uniformly that gays and lesbians do not constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class.127
The suspect class strategy represented a very sensible effort to demonstrate
the construction of gays and lesbians as different and to establish the invidious
discrimination against them. The analysis was a valiant and thoughtful effort to
work within the existing tiers of equal protection scrutiny-it was also an
accurate description of a group that had been constructed as a discrete and insular
minority--but one that would have concretized doctrinally permanent outsider
124 See, e.g., Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class,
34 S. Tax. L. REv. 205, 240-42 (1993); Tracey Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the
Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773, 774 (1988); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753,
1753 (1996); Harris M. Miller 1I, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 810-
11 (1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1287 (1985).
125 See, e.g., Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261,266 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Since Bowers, every circuit court which has addressed the issue has
decreed that homosexuals are entitled to no special constitutional protection, as either a suspect
or a quasi-suspect class, because the conduct which places them in that class is not
constitutionally protected."); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[1]f the
government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that
conduct cannot constitute a 'suspect class.").
126 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination and still do, though possibly now in
less degree .... In these times homosexuals are proving that they are not without growing
political power."); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1988) ('Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence
is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage.').
127 See Equality Found, 54 F3d at 267; High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 570-73; Ben-
Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 n.8; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir.
1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd.
of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F.
Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1993). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428,
1446 (9th Cir. 1988); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58-59 (Haw. 1993).
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status for gays and lesbians. 128
Outsider theory has been willing to explore quite usefully the role of
sexuality in shaping the identity of gays and lesbians. 129 However, when an
unsympathetic majority bases distinctions on sexuality, those inquiries tend to
focus on sexual practices and they are typically used as a means for quarantine
and condemnation. This was the definitional logic of the Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick,130 when it upheld Georgia's right to criminalize sodomy, implicitly
assuming either that sodomy was exclusively a homosexual practice or that
homosexual sodomy was exclusively criminalized. The Bowers Court refused to
draw on the line of procreation and privacy cases because it found "[n]o
connection between family . . . and homosexual activity."'131 Homosexual
identity and homosexual relationships were reduced to "acts of... sodomy,"
devoid of love or intimacy (let alone affection, fidelity, or commitment). 132
The congressional classifications underlying the military's "don't ask, don't
tell" policy suffered from the same majoritarian preoccupation with the sexual
activities of gay and lesbian servicemembers. The National Defense
Authorization Act defined those who may be terminated from the military based
on either their marriage or "attempt[ ] to marry a person known to be of the same
biological sex." Furthermore, under the Act, a service member also may be
terminated if he or she has: (1) "engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act" or (2) "stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual,... unless... the member has demonstrated that he or
she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. '133 Plaintiffs challenging
military discharges have argued that a distinction exists between the status of
128 Of course the point of suspect class status is to eliminate governmental use of the
disfavored classification and hence to more fully integrate those groups previously excluded by
the classification.
129 See generally JOHN D'EMuO, SEXUAL PoLmcs, SEXUAL COMMUNrmIs: THE
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); LLIAN
FADERMAN, ODD Gnus AND TWILIGHT LovERs: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TwENTmT-
CENTURY AMERICA (1991); FOUCAULT, supra note 66; EDWARD 0. LAUMANN Er AL., THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (1994);
ROBERT A. PADGUG, PASSION AND POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 14 (Kathy Peiss et al. eds.,
1989); RrrcH C. SAVIN-WILAMS, GAY AND LESBIAN YOUTH: EXPRESSIONS OF IDENMIY
(1990); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993).
130 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
131 Id at 191.
13 2 See id. at 192; see also Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion:
Reconceptualizing the Role ofthe Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 180 (1999).
133 10 U.S.C. § 654(bXl)-(2) (West 1994).
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one's sexual orientation and the conduct of engaging in prohibited acts.134 The
technique had been successful in some high visibility cases that challenged the
previous military ban on homosexuals. 135 But it was a strategy with the
enormous cost of distorting the lived experiences of and denying the importance
of intimate relationships to gay and lesbian service members. "These plaintiffs
present themselves as people who have never had an intimate relationship in the
past, who will never have an intimate relationship in the future as long as they
serve, and who will never even have a propensity to have an intimate relationship
as long as they serve." 136 Bordering on the "factually absurd," as Diane Mazur
has argued, "it just encourages the search for conduct"'137
Arguments regarding the status or conduct distinction, while a valiant effort
to show discrimination based on group belonging, unfortunately did not have the
desired effect.138 Courts misunderstood the class construction implications of the
argument and instead insisted on defining homosexuals by conduct, targeting
their attention to sexual practices.139 Once group belonging is defined solely by
physical acts (particularly sexual acts of a group that is thought to violate gender
norms), unrelated to human desires or community, it becomes easy to vilify the
group.
This is not to suggest that outsider theory should self-censor for fear of
134 See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir.
1997) (plaintiffs argued that "it is not rational for the government to presume from statements
regarding homosexual orientation that they will likely engage in homosexual conduct");
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 930 (4th Cir. 1996) (arguing that it is i-ational to assume
"that declared homosexuals possess a unique propensity to engage in homosexual acts").
135 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Moralijy, and the Law: Devlin Revisited,
57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 237, 294 (1996) (noting that "[tjhe intense effort on the part of some gay
legal advocates to avoid the Hardwick trap by decoupling sexual orientation from sexual
conduct leads to some Alice-in-Wonderland type claims, which might be amusing if the
outcome of the effort were not so potentially destructive").
136 Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military"
Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 223,239 (1996).
137 Id. at 235.
138 See, eg., Holmes, 124 F3d at 1134 (discharged service members contended that "it is
not rational for the government to presume from statements regarding homosexual orientation
that they will likely engage in homosexual conduct").
139 See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930 ("Mhe legislature was certainly entitled to
presume that a service member who declares that he is gay has a propensity to engage in
homosexual acts .... Thomasson did not demonstrate that he lacked a propensity to engage in
homosexual acts."); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F3d
261, 267 ("Those persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation
are so affected not because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which identifies them
as homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual:).
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misinterpretation. The point is simply the pragmatic observation that outsider
theories may be ineffectual, at least in the short term-they will not cause
unwilling majority group members to test their own assumptions. At worst, their
points may be intentionally perverted.' 40
The outsider strategy has a dark side, not of its own making, but in its
cultural reception. The dominant culture suffers from a willingness to believe the
stories of perversity about homosexuals: gays and lesbians are hypersexual,
promiscuous, and predatory.14' Any singular intemperate political action is
assumed to be representative of all individuals in the group.142 For traditionalists,
even theoretical discussions of sexuality and sexual identity fed beliefs that
homosexuals were being inappropriately sexual in public.' 43
Outsider theory was theoretically productive, attacking the objectivity and
exposing the assumptions of the dominant culture, while formal equality theory
attained more judicial and legislative successes. Yet neither theory has been
consistently successful: The formal equality model played into traditionalism,
140 See Larry Cati Backer, By Hook or by Crook- Conformity, Assimilation and Liberal
and Conservative Poor Relief Theory, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 391 (1996).
Marginalized by dominant culture, consigned to the zoo of exotic (but dangerous)
endeavors, transformative critical (outsider) theory at times best serves the very members
of the dominant culture which this theory seeks to recast. Critical theory can be the
dominant culture's theoretical bogeymen. It assumes its greatest social utility as fairy
stories evoking images of the evil (witches, goblins, little people, spirits, deformities-you
choose) which live in the dark, apocryphal forest just outside the safe clearing of current
dominant norms. These are the kind of stories used by a dominant culture to reinforce its
cultural norms.
Id at 433.
14 1 See Mary E. Becker, The Abuse Excuse and Patriarchal Narratives, 92 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1459, 1478 (1998) ('Gay men are particularly disgusting; because of their perverse
sexual natures, they are essentially sexual and immoral and quite likely to abuse
children .... Lesbians are also perverse, immoral, and hypersexual; allegations that they abuse
children are also quite credible though unsupported by evidence."); see also, e.g., State v.
Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512-13 (Mo. 1986) (referring to "the general promiscuity
characteristic of the homosexual lifestyle" as supporting the legislative enactment of a deviate
sexual intercourse law).
142 See Hastings Wyman, Jr., Wen Values Clash, WASH. POST, June 2, 1997, at X08
(describing the "Religious Right strategy of citing examples of gay extremism-e.g., the
Lesbian Avengers wearing 'We Recruit' T-shirts to a public school-to demonstrate that
homosexuals prey on children").
14 3 See, eg., Roger Kimball, What Next, a Doctorate of Depravity?, WALL ST. L, May 5,
1998, at A22 (describing queer theory as "a mixture of deconstruction and Marxism: that is,
hermetic gobbledygook and radical political enmity" and "an effort to make one's private
sexual interests the chief focus of one's academic workld).
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while the outsider strategy was twisted to support preexisting beliefs that sexual
others are dangerously different. While not all theorists are on one side and all
activists and litigators on the other, the divide widens between liberationist
academics stressing outsider theories and gay rights litigators and lobbyists
fighting in the trenches with the weapons of formal equality.144
IV. MOVING BEYOND FORMAL EQUALIY
This Part asks in what ways gay legal theory can represent gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transsexual relations that will change the broader cultural discourse
about sexual others. Any theory that advocates a re-presentation of the lives of
sexual minorities needs to avoid the dangers of formal equality theory and the
possible, perhaps probable, misinterpretations of outsider theory. Is there a
potential coherent theory that can tap the transformative possibilities of outsider
theory and the pragmatic successes of equality theory without contributing to
retrenchment?
This Part begins by looking for common threads in successful sexual
orientation cases. A common theme in cases that have moved us toward greater
inclusion in the culture's most sacred institutions-adoption, marriage, the
workplace, and the military-is the use of litigation strategies and lobbying
efforts that emphasize shared humanity. Some courts are reaching healthy results
by, often unconsciously, adopting that focus. Some of the cases discussed in this
Part are equal protection cases, others use substantive due process arguments, but
the strategy they share is the fimdamental recognition that human beings are
equal in worth. In short, many of these cases look at what makes us the same,
144 See supra text accompanying notes 57-72, and infra text accompanying notes 274-
75. Interview with Anthony E. Varona, General Counsel and Legal Director of the Human
Rights Campaign (July 23, 1999) ("One is often in the academic camp that doesn't worry
about political realities or in the camp that lives those political realities and worries about
lobby-friendly arguments.); Interview with Evan Wolfson, Marriage Project Director, Lambda
Legal Defense & Education Fund (July 26, 1999) ("There is often a real disconnect between
many academics and those of us working to persuade the not-yet-converted non-gay majority
in the legislatures, law courts, and food courts. Gay rights advocates often find themselves
confronted with a growing body of 'scholarship' making right-wing arguments, marshaling
bogus evidence, or trying to poke holes in and raise doubts about the arguments and evidence
we put forward, without much assistance from gay and 'friendly' scholars on our side in
meeting those attacks or assuaging the concerns of judges and legislators."). Some gay legal
theorists, though, demonstrate keen sensitivity to the cultural and political reception of theory
arguments. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALrrY, GENDER,
AND THE LAW 227-318 (1997); Barbara J. Cox, The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage as an
Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 155 (1997); Chai R.
Feldblun, A Progressive Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEvP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REv. 485 (1998).
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rather than what makes us different.
But the sameness in these cases is not the sameness of equality theory. It
does not begin with a comparison of homosexuals and heterosexuals or question
whether homosexuals measure up. Instead, the successful litigation and
legislative strategies emphasize shared humanity irrespective of sexual
orientation: not what makes gays the same as straights, but what are good
qualities that make straights and gays alike as people.145
The second section of this Part builds on the common humanity cases, as
well as writings in anthropology, sociology, and philosophy, to develop a
jurisprudential theory of shared humanity. While the humanist theory is applied
here specifically in the context of decisions about sexual minorities, it can guide
thinking to shape both the discourse and decisional practices with respect to
other oppressed groups.
A. Cases Emphasizing Our Common Humanity
A number of cases across the country, at various levels, both state and
federal, particularly in the past half decade, have acknowledged the fiudamental
humanity of sexual minorities. These cases range from political participation to
adoption, retention of rent-controlled apartments to military service; but they all
partake of a vision of sexual others as people of competence, people with deep
familial relations, people deserving of love and respect and civil belonging, as
part of a human community.
Romer v. Evans146 was a momentous Supreme Court decision in this regard.
In Romer, the Court invalidated a voter referendum that prohibited the passage or
enforcement of any laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. The Court tackled the antigay initiative head-on, stating explicitly
that animosity toward gays and lesbians is not a legitimate state interest. 147
Romer was the first time the Supreme Court sustained a discrimination claim by
145 Since "good" is not a term with universal meaning, identifying the good is, in the end,
a moral exercise. An emerging debate in gay legal theory is whether sexual outsiders should
engage in moral argumentation or whether this form of argument legitimizes antigay morality
rhetoric. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social
Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL L. REV. 253, 266-68; Mark Strasser, Fit
to Be 7Y7ed: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 854
(1997). As I detail later, infra text accompanying note 227, since moral arguments should turn
on reason and the accumulation of empirical evidence across disciplines and cultures (rather
than, say, religion), moral arguments are imperative, as is defining criteria for distinguishing
among them.
146 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
147 Id. at 634.
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homosexuals. 148
Why did Romer work? Why was the Court willing to give the rational basis
test some bite? One answer may be a matter of constitutional theory: if hatred-
the "'bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group' 149 -is a legitimate
government purpose, it is difficult to imagine any purported government reason
that would ever fail the rational basis test.150
Another answer may be that we are seeing the gradual enfranchisement of an
underclass group that parallels the historical process of rights-conferral on other
disempowered groups in this country. The rights-garnering patterns of other
minority groups show that first, legal rights (to sue or enter contracts) are
attained, political enfranchisement follows (the rights to vote, hold office, or
serve on juries),15' and only later, when constructions of deviance and
subordination are shorn away, do "rights" of social participation follow.
For women the Married Women's Property Acts of the 1840s and voting
rights in 1920 presaged later triumphs in the areas of education, employment,
and reproductive rights.152 For members of racial and ethnic minorities, legal
and franchise rights came close together. Some rights in the social arena came
early, while others, such as the formal right to equal educational opportunities
and the right to intermarry came later.153 Of course, exclusionary social practices
in employment, housing, and education are still being litigated today.154
Legal rights (to sue, enter contracts, and inherit property from other than a
same sex partner) have long been available to sexual minorities, principally
because this facet of identity is one that, for the most part, is not visible. Political
enfranchisement has been the next step. Romer and the range of cases supporting
First Amendment rights for gay and lesbian student groups155 may indicate the
148 See Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren
Court.Activism, 1996 SUP. Cr. REv. 67,68 n.3.
14 9 Id. (quoting Department ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
150 See Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of
Judicial Technique, 108 YALE Li. 439,448 n.32 (1998).
151 See Michael W. McConnell, Otginalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 1024 (1995); Louisa S. Ruffine, Civil Rights and Suffrage: Myra Bradwell's
Strugglefor the Equal Citizenship for Women, 4 HASTINGS WOMEN's Li. 175, 177-78 (1993).
152 See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work- The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L. 1073 (1994).
15 3 See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., THE SMART CULTURE: SOCIETY, INTELUGENCE, AND
LAw 61-90 (1998).
154 See Evelyn Nieves, Civi Rights Groups Suing Berkeley over Admissions Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9.
155 See infra text accompanying notes 175-76.
[Vol. 61:867
A DIFFERENTKIND OF SAMENESS
historic pattern of rights-conferral.
But perhaps Romer can be read more generously. Perhaps it indicates the
Court's willingness to acknowledge the fundamental humanity of homosexuals,
and to bring them within the protection of the anticaste principle-that a state
cannot create an electoral underclass. 156 Justice Kennedy began his opinion in
Romer by recounting the admonition of the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v.
Ferguson, that "the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.' ' 157 Later in the opinion, the Court recognized the isolationism caused
by Amendment 2: "the amendment imposes a special disability upon those
persons alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint." 158
In this more generous reading of Romer, the majority's silence regarding
Hardwick predicts its eclipse.159 The Court's denial of certiorari in Equality
Foundation1 60 then might suggest the Court's expectation that if a group loses in
the political process, it is a one-time loss, not a complete bar to access. Or,
viewed more benignly still, perhaps the Court's denial of certiorari says nothing
about the Supreme Court's view of the merits. In any event the certiorari denial
in Equality Foundation and silence in Romer regarding the precedential force of
Hardwick both indicate that any principle of humanity the Court is
acknowledging is fledging at best.
But if Romer does embody the anticaste principle, it becomes a recognition
of universal rights. 161 In the hierarchy of constitutional rights, Romer dealt with
156 See Cass p. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2441 (1994);
see also West, supra note 92, at 1319.
These wondrous moments, these sudden and dramatic and inclusive acts, which
simultaneously expand the reach of the political community by acknowledging the
commonality of the human community, are rare, but they do occur, and when they occur,
they are precious. The importance, the beauty, and the wonder of the Supreme Court's
decision in Romer, lie in the fact that it wasjust such a moment
Id.
157 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (dissenting opinion)).
158 Id. at 631.
159 See Tobias Barrington Wol% Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE LJ. 247, 252
(1996).
160 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 298
(6th Cir. 1997).
161 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for
one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.").
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one that was close to sacrosanct: the right to participate in the democratic
process. This right to partake in civic life was both fundamental and enjoyed by
all people: "These are protections taken for granted by most people either
because they already have them or do not need them: these are protetions
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.'' 162 In emphasizing the shared
right to political participation, the Court recognized the citizenship and the need
for political belonging of sexual outsiders. In the Court's words, a state cannot
make [gay and lesbian people] "unequal to everyone else .... A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."' 63 Given the Court's
unwillingness to add new suspect or quasi-suspects classes, shared humanity
theory may prove more fruitful in affecting the Court's reasoning regarding the
other equal protection strand, fundamental rights analysis.
The shared humanity idea also manifests in discriminatory treatment cases,
such as Nabozny v. Podlesny.164 For years Jamie Nabozny was harassed and
physically abused by fellow students during his middle and high school years.
They struck him, spit on him, called him a faggot; shoved him to the floor,
pushed him so forcefully he fell into a urinal, and "perfomed a mock rape on
[him]" while a group of "twenty other students looked on and laughed.'1 65 He
was beaten and kicked so severely he collapsed with internal bleeding. As a
result of the abuse, Jamie attempted suicide twice. The school official in charge
of discipline "laughed and told Nabozny that [he] deserved this treatment
because he is gay."166 The principal also told him that if he was going to be
"openly gay," he should expect this sort of abuse. Despite repeated requests for
help and despite a school policy of investigating and disciplining cases of assault
and sexual harassment the administrators "turned a deaf ear" on Nabozny's
pleas for help and, indeed, "mocked [his] predicament."'167
The panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Nabozny stated
an equal protection claim for purposeful discrimination and deliberate
indifference of school officials based on both gender and sexual orientation.
162 Id. at 631.
163 Id. at 635. "[P]Iaintiffs argued that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other state and federal constitutional provisions, by
consigning 'gay men, lesbians and bisexuals to a second class citizenship."' Stephanie L.
Grauerholz, Comment Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental
Right to Participate in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 841, 845 (1995) (citing the
complaint).
164 92 F3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
165 1'ad at 451.
166 Id. at 452.
167Id. at 449.
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Although Wisconsin had a state statute protecting students from discrimination
based on sex and sexual orientation, the court specifically said it was not relying
on the statute.16 Importantly, Nabozny represents the first federal appellate
decision acknowledging that discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex
discrimination. 169
Nabozny is more than a breakthrough in equal protection jurisprudence. The
Nabozny court was not only sensitive to gender stereotyping, 170 it comprehended
human vulnerability. Devoting a substantial amount of time to detailing the
treatment Janie suffered at the hands of his peers and school officials,1 71 the
Nabozny court recognized the lived experiences of being gay, and being "treated
differently from other students."172
On remand, a jury issued a liability verdict in favor of Jamie, and the school
district ultimately settled the case for $900,000.173
It might also be argued that this humanist analysis ignores the legalistic core
of Romer. Perhaps Romer is not so symbolically significant Maybe it is just the
minimalist reaction of a conservative Court to an overreaching statute. Skeptics
might also argue that Romer and Nabozny are not really about sameness or
respect for humanity. Perhaps these are cases at the fringe in which compellingly
horrific facts made good law. Maybe they really reflect revulsion at the extremes
of subordination, and only when subordination goes so far as to be inexplicable,
does the mainstream revolt Colorado's Amendment 2 was the hate-motivated
political equivalent of the racial internment cases. School administrators in
Nabozny were more than unresponsive, they were complicit in the face of
extreme physical abuse. This reading of Romer and Nabozny would see courts as
condemning only extremist behavior but not actually respecting common
features of humanity. Viewed this way, Romer and Nabozny stand for revulsion
at the defendants' behavior rather than respect for the plaintiffs' humanity. Can
we count on courts to truly understand when it comes to core human attributes
and desires in less egregious circumstances?
168 See id at457n.11.
1 6 9 Id. at 458.
170 See id at 455-56 (interpreting Mississsippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982), as making clear that schools 'may not discriminate in their protection of men and
women based on a stereotype of feminine weakness or inferiority).
171 See ia at 451-53. For a superb example of briefing, in which Jamie Nabozny's
attorneys detailed the horrors he experienced year by year, in each grade from seventh through
eleventh, see Patricia M. Logue & David S. Buckel, Fighting Anti-Gay Abuse in Schools: The
Opening Appellate Brief of Plaintiff Jamie Nabozny in Nabozny v. Podlesny, 4 MICH. J.
GENDER& L. 425,429-41 (1997).
172 Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 454.
173 See $900,000 Won by Gay Man in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1996, at B 11.
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Some language in the opinions indicates that the courts actually were
concerned with the core humanity of the plaintiffs. 174 Even if Romer and
Nabozny are reactions to the extremes, they still can be seen as progress. Most
importantly, Romer and Nabozny are not isolated cases. They are part of a small
but growing number of cases attesting to the common humanity of all people that
transcends differences of culture, politics, and identity.
The humanization principle can be seen in the First Amendment cases
regarding gay and lesbian student groups. Despite the precedents that high school
students generally have fewer rights than other groups of citizens, these cases
virtually uniformly uphold the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual
student groups to recognition and funding.175 Perhaps these cases are purely
victories of formal equality-commanding that institutions must recognize or
fund all groups meeting neutral criteria. 176 The language in these cases is also
heavily laced with traditional First Amendment rhetoric regarding viewpoint
restriction, but it does contain nuggets which suggest that sexual minorities are
entitled to an undifferentiated status: They are people who must be included in
the community of political equals, people who are worthy of being heard
irrespective of their group identity.177
One aspect of humanization that has received somewhat less attention than
others is the increasing recognition by courts and legislatures of the importance
174 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (stating that law requires "a
commitmentto... neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake"); Nabozny, 92 F.3d at
451-52 (describing Jamie's childhood, pre-adolescence, and teenage years); id. at 454
(discussing differential treatment experienced by Jamie compared to other students). Compare
Romer, 517 U.S. at 630 (incorporating comfortably the terms "gays and lesbians") with Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (never once using the terms). See also supra text
accompanying notes 157-58, 162.
175 See Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988); Gay
Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Lib v. Univ. of Mo.,
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir.
1976); Gay Students Org. Univ. N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Student
Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979);
Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So.
2d455 (Fla. 1982).
176 In response, the school board in Utah eliminated all extracurricular student groups in
order to get rid of the Gay-Straight Alliance. Club Ban Aimed at Gays Hurting Other Students,
DEs Moms REG., Dec. 6, 1998, at 8A.
177 See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1548, 1554 n.41
(M.D. Ala. 1996) (noting in response to defendant's justification for refising to find LGB
group because that would promote a "homosexual lifestyle" prohibited by the state's sodomy
laws: "There is nothing before the court, and the court is not otherwise aware of any study or
evidence, that would indicate that homosexual people manifest any different range of lifestyles
from that of heterosexual people.'), aft'd, 110 F.3d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
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of sexual intimacy between consenting adults. Despite the Supreme Court's
refusal in Bowers v. Hardwick178 to extend privacy protection to homosexual
intimacy, in the thirteen years since Hardwick a number of state legislatures have
decriminalized sodomy, and several state courts have interpreted state
constitutions to protect private, consensual sexual activity.179 In November of
1998, in Powell v. State,180 the Georgia Supreme Court held the very sodomy
statute at issue in Hardwick unconstitutional under Georgia Constitution's due
process clause. Although the facts in Powell were perhaps less than ideal for the
principle-a charge of aggravated (nonconsensual) sodomy by an uncle upon his
wife's 17-year-old niece and a conviction on the lesser offense of consensual
sodomy-the court's language was sweeping in its recognition of "the right of
privacy guaranteed all Georgia citizens .... ,"181 "We cannot think of any other
activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and more deserving
of protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual
activity."' 82 Similarly, the Kentucky and Montana Supreme Courts and the
Tennessee Court of Appeals have struck as unconstitutional sodomy statutes that
infringed on consensual, noncommercial same sex activity.' 83 The right to
intimate sexual activity was a right of "adults," not any particular group. The
courts' articulation of this right demonstrates a recognition of similar needs
among all people for privacy with respect to their sexual intimacy.184
178 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not "extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy").
179 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the
Closet, 50 VAND. L. REV. 419,432 (1997) ("It is fair to say that no reported state court decision
since Bowers has applied a state sodomy law to private consensual intimacy between two
adults of the same sex").
180 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
181 Ld at 21.
182 Id at 24 (citation omitted).
183 See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Gryczan v. State, 942
P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); see also Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250,263 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1996) ('We think there is little doubt that the State's attempt to rescue homosexuals from a
socially unpopular lifestyle does not provide a compelling reason or even a valid reason for
infringement of the fundamental right of adults to engage in private, noncommercial,
consensual sex."); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203-05 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
unconstitutional Texas statute criminalizing private same-sex sexual relations between
consenting adults).
184 Gryezan, 942 P.2d at 122.
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This strategy of crafting a legal representation that promoted our common
humanity was successful in Braschi v. StahlAssociates Co. 185 in which the New
York Court of Appeals held that the life partner of a deceased tenant was a
"family member" for purposes of a New York rent-control succession law. The
court defined the term "family" to include homosexual couples whose
relationship was a long-term emotional commitment, and who were
economically and socially interdependent. As with Nabzony, success on a shared
humanity theory in Braschi comes in a statutory interpretation case, indicating
that the theory may prove most fruitful in influencing the humanist expansion of
terms in statutes rather than in creating sweeping constitutional rights by
reshaping interpretation of the equal protection clause.
Braschi was a landmark decision in its recognition of nontraditional
families. The court defined "family," in part, as 'a group of people united by
certain convictions or common affiliation' .... "186By determining that "those
who reside in households having all of the normal familial characteristics" are a
family, the court distinguished familial relationships from the situations of "mere
roommates" or groups with "superficial" connections but related by blood or
law.187 The court enumerated a variety of factors that characterize family
relationships: "the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of
emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have
conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the
reliance placed upon one another for daily family services." 188 The court gave
principal importance to the "expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear
units," and referred to several cases giving official recognition to other
nontraditional family units, such as an orphan who was never formally adopted
but who lived in the family home for 34 years, "two men living in a 'father-son'
relationship" for a quarter of a century, and heterosexual life partners. 189
Quite simply, consenting adults expect that neither the state nor their neighbors will be co-
habitants of their bedrooms. Moreover, while society may not approve of the sexual
practices of homosexuals, or, for that matter, sodomy, oral intercourse or other sexual
conduct between husband and wife or between other heterosexuals, that is not to say that
society is unwilling to recognize that all adults, regardless of gender or marital state, at
least have a reasonable expectation that their sexual activities will remain personal and
private.
Id.
185 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
186 Id. at 54 (citation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTHNEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY
448 (1984)).
187 id
188 Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
189 Id at 54, 55 (citation omitted).
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Braschi does a wonderful job of demonstrating that there is an independent,
human-centered (i.e. nonheterocentric) way of recognizing the significance of
certain types of relationships that share important characteristics-both for the
participants and for society. Long term commitment (even if it sometimes fails),
unit decision making, and willingness to care for others in "sickness and health"
(What better example do we have than some of the histories of gay men caring
for partners dying of AIDS? 190) are all valuable attributes for any group of
human beings.
Some, perhaps most, courts have been limited in their extension of Braschi,
rigidly applying the list of family characteristics to exclude some couples or
relationships from familial benefits, such as survivor's statutory shares. 191
Relationships of shorter duration or fewer than all the formalities have had
difficulty gaining recognition.192 Yet Braschi has encouraged the official
acknowledgement of nontraditional family arrangements in various contexts. 193
190 See generally STEVEN DIEIZ, LONELY PLANET (1994).
191 See, eg., Court Decisions, Raum v. Restaurant Assoc., Inc., N.Y.U., July 13, 1998,
at 26 (denying homosexual partners the right to bring wrongful death actions); see also Secord
v. Fischetti, 653 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (upholding administrative
determination that life partners were not surviving "spouses" for purposes of crime victims
compensation); In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798-99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (refusing to
allow a homosexual partner to be considered a surviving "spouse" for purposes of intestate
succession).
192 See, e.g., GSL Enter., Inc. v. Lopez, 656 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(finding no familial connection in eleven year relationship where parties shared expenses,
vacationed together, and had some joint credit cards); Court Decisions, 54 Featherco, Inc. v.
Correa, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1997, at 21 (refusing to grant rent control succession rights where
lesbian couple had 13 year relationship because of a lack of documentation of intermingled
finances or expenses or any formalized legal obligations); see also Craig W. Christensen, IfNot
Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1754 n.341 (1998) (referring to an unreported New York case in
which a same sex couple failed the Braschi test "because the deceased partner did not leave a
will or name his partner as an insurance policy beneficiary"); Mary Anne Case, Couples and
Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History ofLitigatingfor Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REv. 1643, 1664-65 (1993) (suggesting that the Braschi court actually
required "rather conservative things" of the partners in that case).
193 See, e.g., Reep v. Commissioner of the Dep't. of Employment & Training, 593
N.E.2d 1297, 1300-01 (Mass. 1992) (using Brashi to find an unmarried heterosexual partner
may be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits when leaving employment to
relocate with partner); Court Decisions, Slattery v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1999,
at 28-29 (relying on Braschi to uphold New York City's domestic partners law); Court
Decisions, Colon v. Fris, N.Y.L., July 8, 1994, at 31 (finding that two women who had lived
in a nonsexual relationship as sisters for 34 years were family members for purposes of rent
control succession, despite separate finances).
Four months after Braschi, the Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Association was able to use
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More generally, Braschi and other cases truly contemplating the meaning of
families advanced the expansion of society's definition of "family": familial
relationships are coming to be understood in emotional and functional terms,
such as love, care, commitment, and economic dependency, rather than in legal
or structural terms.1 94
This same theme characterizes gay stranger and second parent adoption
cases. A small but growing number of jurisdictions are willing to allow adoption
by gays and lesbians. 195 Although courts historically used and some presently
the decision to successfully advocate with the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal that disabled veterans who "lived in family arrangements with other
veterans with whom they bonded emotionally and shared services and expenses" were family
for rent stabilization purposes. Lynn M. Kelly, Lawyeringfor Poor Communities on the Cusp
of the Next Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 724 (1998). Braschi also prompted an
amendment of the rent and eviction regulations and the rent stabilization code that enlarged the
definition of protected family members for rent control and rent stabilization purposes. See
Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 629 (N.Y. 1993) (upholding the
regulations); see also In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that a lesbian should be named legal guardian of her partner); Stewart v.
Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993) (finding that, although now moot, gay companion in "close spousal-like relationship"
could make burial arrangements for deceased partner); In re Adult Anonymous IT, 452
N.Y.S2d 198, 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (allowing adult adoption to serve "as a legal
mechanism for achieving economic, political and social objectives rather than the stereotype
parent-child relationship").
194 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137-41 (1989) (Brenman, J., dissenting);
Paris R. Baldacci, Pushing the Law to Encompass the Reality of Our Families: Protecting
Lesbian and Gay Families from Eviction from Their Homes-Braschi 's Functional Definition
of "Family" and Beyond, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 973, 977 (1994); Shoshana Bricklin,
Legislative Approaches to Support Family Diversity, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. Ras. L. REV. 379,
379(1998).
195 Only one state statutorily prohibits gays and lesbians from adopting. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997). Twelve states and the District of Columbia have allowed gay
or lesbian stranger or second parent adoption. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C.
1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 894 (fI1. App. CL 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
315, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (NJ.
Super. CL Ch. Div. 1993); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001-02 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1992); In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 890 (Ohio 1990); Adoption of BJ.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993); Christensen, supra note 192, at 1767 n.417 (citing lower
court decisions from Alaska, California, Indiana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
Decisions in a number of other states have foreclosed gay stranger or coparent adoptions. See
In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); In
re Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d
678 (Wis. 1994); see also Kulla v McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (denying
visitation). Even within ajurisdiction, courts reach contrary results. Compare In re Adoption of
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (allowing mother's partner to adopt child so that he could be raised
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still use a parent's status as a sexual other to deny custody or visitation, these
cases may be diminishing.196 When people in committed relationships seek to
expand their family through adoption or second parent adoption, a number of
courts have endorsed the idea that these families will provide a loving, nurturing
home life for a child. 197
Braschi and other cases that value nontraditional intimate relations198 go
beyond simple comparisons of heterosexual and homosexual unions. What they
recognize are those characteristics that are common to families and the value of
families of choice. These successful efforts to define families in emotional terms,
as opposed to legal terms, indicates a shift in focus toward recognizing the
importance of human emotional commitment Families are groups unified not by
formal legal events but by love, care, and interdependence.
In a variety of domains, courts are beginning to acknowledge basic human
needs and characteristics shared by all people-needs for intimacy, familial
belonging, expression, security, bodily integrity, and civic participation, to name
but a few. This resonates with modem philosophical and anthropological
writings that argue persuasively that humans across cultures have similar senses,
needs, capabilities, qualities, characteristics, and desires, which can be identified
by both parents), with In re Dana, 624 N.Y.S.2d 634,636-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (refusing
to allow natural mother's female life partner to adopt child even though mother consented).
196 See William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family Is It Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for
Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 579, 580 (1996);
Karen Markey, Note, An Overview of the Legal Challenges Faced by Gay and Lesbian
Parents: How Courts Treat the Growing Number of Gay Families, 14 N.YL. SCH. J. HuM.
RTS. 721 (1998). Butsee Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (allowing change
in custody from mother to father based on father's new marriage and change in mother's
relationship from "discreef ' to open lesbian relationship in which the partners "kiss and show
romantic affection for each other in the child's presence"); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d
510,512 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Phillips v. Phillips, No. CA94-03-005, 1995 WL 115426, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1995) (finding an abuse of discretion by trial court that gave a lesbian
mother physical custody of her children).
197 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 998-99 (stating that second parent
adoption by lesbian mother would afford six year old son important economic and legal rights,
to inheritance, social security, medical, and educational benefits, and most importantly,
emotional benefits and "additional security conferred by formal recognition in an organized
society.').
19 8 See, eg., Angelilli v. Conshohocken, No. CIV.A.96-33al, 1996 WL 663871, at *2-
*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1996) (allowing a heterosexual woman, fired for having an adulterous
relationship with her supervisor, to sue under title VII and section 1983, and finding that this
"love relationship" with the partners cohabiting, although adulterous, could rise to the level of a
constitutionally "protected intimate association," although more facts needed to be developed
regarding the length, nature, exclusivity, and the degree of commitment in the relationship).
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through reason.19 9 Yet human nature is not fixed and personhood is, in important
ways, a relational construct.200 Numerous writers, in disciplines ranging from
philosophy to sociology to law, are coming to understand that human nature can
be both universal-with many qualities shared across time and cultures-and
contingent-with characteristics forged by various social influences.201 Without
199 See, e.g., MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 76 (1948) ('To say that there is no absolute criterion of value or
morals ... does not mean that such criteria, in differingforms, do not comprise universals in
human culture.... certain values in human life are everywhere accorded recognition, even
though the institutions ofno two cultures are identical in form. Morality is a universal, and so is
enjoyment of beauty, even some standard of truth."); JAMES I=n, SCIENCE, REASON, AND
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PRINCIPLES OF RATIONAL INQUIRY 129 (1997) (arguing that shared
features across cultures-that all humans use language, classify each other according to status,
role and kinship, display emotion, recognize time, understand logic, think causally and so on-
indicate "a universal human nature"); CLAUDE L I-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING 19 (1979)
(contending that "notwithstanding the cultural differences between the several parts of
mankind, the human mind is everywhere one and the same..."); see also Ralph Linton,
Universal Ethical Principles: An Anthropological View, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF ACroN:
MAN'S ETHICAL IMPERATIVE 645, 657 (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed. 1952); THOMAS NAGEL, THE
LAST WORD (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in
13 MiDWEsT STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 32 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1988); MICHAEL J.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAw: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 47-48 (1988); Louis Henkin,
The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
15 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment, 6 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 197 (1994); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 962-65 (1982) (offering various philosophical views of personhood and employing the
traditional view of persons as rational, reflective beings).
20 0 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODrrIES 56 (1996) (stating that "a
better view of personhood should understand many kinds of particulars-one's politics, work,
religion, family, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral
commitments, character, and personal attributes--as integral to the self.").20 1 See, eg., MARVIN HARRIS, OUR KIND: WHO WE ARE WHERE WE CAME FROM AND
WHERE WE ARE GOING 230 (1989) (explaining that an assumed biopsychological need to
reproduce may instead be a need among primates across cultures for "close, affectionate,
emotional relationships with supportive, concerned, trustworthy and approving beings"); ALFM
KOHN, THE BRIGHTER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM AND EMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1990) (rejecting a strong deterministic view of human nature, but culling data over time and in
various cultures "to support the proposition that it is as 'natural' to help as it is to hurt, that
concern for the well-being of others cannot be reduced to self-interest, that social structures
predicated on human selfishness have no claim to inevitability'); see also Kathryn Abrams,
Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE LJ.
1533, 1554 (1994) (book review); Robert Justin Lipkin, Kibbitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without
Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69, 96
(1991). Sam Marcosson makes a similar point: that sexual orientation is a classification that is,
at once, both immutable and socially constructed. Sam Marcosson, Constructive Immutability
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dipping into sociobiological explanations,202 and while withholding empirical
judgment about human nature, we can still believe as a matter of social and
political philosophy that it is wise to search for and respect shared human needs
and desires.
Of course, societies construct circumstances in which people experience
those shared needs, but are permitted to satisfy their common desires unequally,
if at all.20 3 Extreme relativists may disagree about the validity of claims to
universal human nature, arguing that "[a]ny effort to establish such a universal
perspective is essentialist, and likely also to be racist, ethnocentric, sexist or
imperialist, failing to respect the 'radical othemess' of different groups and
cultures."2° 4 Yet recognizing shared needs does not deny differences of identity,
the cultural construction of values, contextual variations in norms and
understandings, or positional truths, "so long as they are grounded in the belief
that there is a core of human personhood that must be acknowledged and
respected."205
B. Shared Humanity Theory
This Section builds on the cases and philosophical writings concerning core
commonalities among humans to construct a theory of shared humanity. It
develops the humanist idea principally as jurisprudential theory because the
cases that support the theory come from domains as diverse as adoption, child
custody, military service, political access, and discrimination in schools. Shared
humanity may also offer a way of re-envisioning constitutional doctrine in both
the substantive due process and equal protection areas. This Section addresses
the ways in which a theory of shared humanity differs from formal equality and
outsider theory and may be a useful way of reconciling the tensions in gay legal
theory.
A theory of shared humanity is based on phenomenology and empiricism; it
is both humanist and rationalist in origin. It seeks to create respect for humans-
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But see ADAM KUPER, THE CHOSEN
PRIMATE: HUMAN NATURE AND CULTURAL DIVERSrIY 229 (1994) (arguing that "[tlhere is no
simple, natural, universal primal constitution of human society').
202 See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (1978).
203 See Martha Nussbaum, Narratives ofHierarchy: Loving v. Virginia and the Literary
Imagination, 17 QUINNPIAC L. REv. 337,344 (1997).
204 Jane E. Larson, "Imagine Her Satisfaction ". The Transformative Task of Feminist
Tort Work, 33 WAsHBURNLJ. 56,68 (1993).
205 Id at 67; see also Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765,
774 (1992) (espousing the ideals of progressivism in which individuals are "strengthened by
caring communities that are both attentive to the shared human needs of its members and
equally mindful of their diversity and differences").
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their shared needs, relationships, choices, and differences-and to promote
prosocial values, such as compassion, love, and tolerance. The fundamental
principles for shared humanity theory are: (1) the recognition of the equal worth
of all people and their entitlement to equal dignity in treatment; (2) respect for
identity differences; and (3) a commitment to reason as the method for deciding
value conflicts.
1. The Recognition ofEqual Worth, the Entitlement to Equal Dignity
The call for equal worth and dignity is made by communitarians,
contractarians, liberals, and critical theorists alike.206 It is implicit in the
Constitution,207 and explicit in the preamble to the United Nation's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.208 Yet as Andrew Koppelman has pointed out
valuing the equal intrinsic dignity and worth of individuals, without inferring
obligations of action, will not guarantee equal treatment. He notes as an example
the Catholic Church's condemnation of homosexuality and, at the same time,
professed respect for the equal dignity and worth of individual homosexuals. 2 09
Fully recognizing the essential humanity of people implies several
206 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 964, 991-92 (1978) (maintaining that a "core truth of social contract doctrines" is that
"the community must respect the dignity and equal worth of its members"); Robert L. Hayman,
Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional
Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 108 (1995) (arguing for two core
commitments: to a universal comprehension-of everyone's truths-and universalized
compassion-for all people, in all circumstances); see also Martin Luther King, Jr., The Ethical
Demands for Integration, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRrITNGS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., at 117, 119 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) (suggesting that the
proclamation "All men... are created equal" supports the "dignity and worth of human
personality'); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 353 (1992) (showing
that "antidiscrimination values" underlying the Equal Protection Clause prohibit state actors
"from acting on the basis of prejudicial or traditional habits of thought that deny the full
humanity, individual worth, and dignity of members of particular groups").
207 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1.; cf KeN L. KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CTzEsHI AND THE CONSTmnON 94 (1989) (showing the important
connection between voting and equal citizenship).
208 GA. Res. 217A(m), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) (unanimously adopted on December 10, 1948, by the United Nations General
Assembly) (explaining that "the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in
the equal rights of men and women").
209 See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
R'rS. J. 89, 117 (1997).
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prescriptions regarding the trealment of fellow humans. Shared humanity
endorses both individual and communal worth, but also acknowledges the reality
and cultural constructions attached to group-belonging. Thus, implicit in the
theory of shared humanity is the antisubordination principle, which is the idea
that discrimination based on group identity is impermissible.210 Socially defined
"stigmatizing inequalities," particularly those of caste, deny "the essential
humanity of those who are stigmatized."211 Government policies and practices
that reinforce social inequality do not work to the good of the community; those
distinctions that dismantle historical injustices promote our common humanity.
But the distinctions themselves must be continually re-evaluated. 212
2. Respecting Identity Differences
The principle of equal worth alone may be so abstract that it is meaningless.
As Michel Rosenfeld has noted in another context; "all nine Justices seem to
agree in Croson ... that the equal protection clause is designed to uphold the
equal worth, dignity, and respect of every individual regardless of race."213 But,
a theory that requires respect for the differences of humanity demands more than
an empty agreement at a high plane of abstraction. A commitment to empathy,
respectful tolerance, and care for others, rather than shared values, will not risk
sacrificing pluralism on the altar of agreement 214
2 10 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1986) (describing the antisubordination principle
as eliminating power disparities "through the development of laws and policies that directly
redress ... disparities"); Barbara . Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and
Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 960 (1994) ("iT]he antisubordination principle
contends that certain groups should not occupy socially, culturally, or materially subordinate
positions in society... [U]nder this conception of equality, government action would be held
constitutionally acceptable only to the extent that it did not create, reinforce, or perpetuate those
groups' subordinate status."); see also CATHARNE A. MACKINNON, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) (arguing that the subordination of women is based on
their group identity).
2 11 Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term: Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1977).
212 See Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"
17 HARV. WoMiN's L. 57, 98 (1994) ("Valuing the principle of antisubordination is more
than a game of hierarchical rankings of 'who's most oppressed'; it means a serious
commitment to evaluating and eradicating all forms of oppression.").
213 Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmon& Affinnative Action and the Elusive Meaning
of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1749 (1989).
214 See Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6 LAw & SEx. 109, 117 (1996); Lynne
Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.. 379, 452 (1991); McClain,
supra note 31, at 29.
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Shared humanity does not rest on comparisons of homosexuality to a
heterosexual norm, nor does it deny important differences of identity features
such as sexual orientation. The twin flaws of the formal equality model are its
heterocentrist bias and its resulting dismissal of difference: if homosexuals differ
from heterosexuals, those departures from the heterosexual norm undercut
claims of rights.215 Shared humanity theory begins from a different premise. It
looks for common characteristics of individuals relative to the purposes of a
law-In what ways are people seeking entrance in the military good soldiers? In
what ways do people seeking to adopt make good parents?-but it also requires
an open-minded inquiry into and acceptance of individual differences and a
careful examination of the ways differences are turned into detriments.
Shared humanity says that because similarities among humans are so great,
once the plaintiff shows differential treatment on the basis of group belonging,
the burden is on the entity differentiating to justify the differences in treatment.
Shared humanity is such a dominant fact that it is presumptively wrong to treat
groups differently-particularly based on culturally constructed identity
differences2 16-- except in the relatively limited ways in which those differences
matter. This, of course, has implications beyond gay legal theory: women need
no urinals in restrooms, and whites do not need as much sickle cell testing, and
sex segregated schools would be presumptively unconstitutional absent evidence
that the differences in the ways boys and girls learn compels separate and
differential treatment.217
A district court decision in the military service cases, Able v. United
States,2 18 which was later reversed on appeal, offers an illustration of the ways
equal protection cases can reach more egalitarian outcomes when courts look
first for shared features of humanity. In this challenge to the "don't ask, don't
tell" policy, the ultimate appellate court decision deferred to Congress in matters
of military assessment, and supported Congress's determination that since gays
were perceived as different, immoral, and possibly predatory, gays who were out
of the closet could be excluded from service because they might upset the morale
2 15 See supra Part Im.C.2.
2 16 Distinguishing between constructed and "real" identity differences is a project that has
absorbed jurists and theorists for decades. One of the recent lessons of both feminism and
critical race theory is that many visible differences actually have little biological importance,
but that culture defines and gives significance to differences of gender and race. See, e.g.,
Hayman, supra note 153, at 129; see also NANCY LEvrr, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN,
AND TEE LAw 2 (1998) ("gendered behaviors are carefully cultivated .... [b]eginning with the
first few moments and months of life....").
2 17 See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term
Consequences ofSex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451,455-64 (1999).
218 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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of a military unit and destroy cohesion.219 The district court's methodology was
in sharp contrast to that of the appellate court.
The district court repeatedly stressed the idea that homosexual service
members simply wanted to be soldiers. It was not just that homosexuals were no
different than heterosexual service members, but that both groups had common
dreams of being soldiers. "The plaintiffs are American citizens. They wish to
serve their country in positions of responsibility and potential danger."220 The
district court in Able looked carefully for commonalities between homosexuals
and heterosexuals, and then asked whether, given those measures of sameness,
the differential government treatment could be justified. Both heterosexual and
homosexual service members were, for the district court, first and foremost
soldiers seeking to serve their country. Indeed, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy
"does not disqualify someone from serving in the Armed Forces," it just
"conditions that service on a homosexual's keeping that orientation a secret. 221
The district court asked whether an "out" homosexual differed from an "out"
heterosexual, questioning the assumption that secrecy reduces security risks:
It is hard to imagine why the mere holding of hands off base and in private is
dangerous to the mission of the Armed Forces if done by a homosexual but not
if done by a heterosexual .... The government does not justify its discrimination
by reference to some defect in the performance of homosexuals, or claim that
they represent a security risk as likely targets for blackmail... or that they are
apt to seduce heterosexuals.222
The court noted that many sexual practices of homosexuals and heterosexuals
were similar, the only difference residing in the sex of the "person's sexual
partner."223
In searching for sameness, the court encouraged other courts to
empathetically imagine "what it might be like to be a homosexual." 224 This was,
perhaps, the most important part of the district court's opinion in Able. The court
recognized the constructed nature of the differences.
219 See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1998).
220 Able, 968 F. Supp. at 861.
221 Id at 864.
2 22 Id. at 857-58.
223 Id at 864. "Sodomy, defined by the Uniform Code of Military Justice as oral or anal
sex, defines the class of homosexuals no more than it does the class of heterosexuals. Studies
of sexual behavior indicate that a large number of heterosexuals engage in oral and/or anal
sex."Id
224 Id at 861.
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For the United States government to require those self-identifying as
homosexuals to hide their orientation and to pretend to be heterosexuals is to ask
them to accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself disgraceful and they
are unfit to serve. To impose such a degrading and deplorable condition for
remaining in the Armed Services cannot in fairness be justified on the ground
that the truth might arouse the prejudice of some of their fellow members. 225
The challenge, of course, is to find ways to convince the general public and
the judiciary that many differences are socially constructed and that society has
attached disadvantages to the constructions of difference. For too long in cases
concerning sexual minorities, the classification of sexual orientation, as defined
by conduct-with the moral opprobrium attached to same-sex sexual relations-
has been the definition of the difference. The difficulty is in how to develop
respect for differences, while taling away the assigned disadvantages.
3. Committing Value Conflicts to Reason and Empiical Inquiry
How then will the hard decisions be made-particularly those that reconcile
the group-orientation of the antisubordination principle with the search for
shared features among the larger collective?22 6
The common good for a theory of shared humanity is not defined in
communitarian terms of shared values227 or in beliefs of deliberative
democracy22 8 because for too long shared values were majoritarian only and the
deliberative process was and still is exclusive.229 It is communitarian in the sense
of valuing equality and believing in the possibility of community, but with a
critical twist: shared humanity does not depend on extolling collective
225 Id
226 See Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 421 (1994) ("The
antisubordination principle requires that the social significance and legality of a practice be
measured in terms of the impact of the practice on the group as a whole.!).
227 See, ag., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERiCA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBUC PHILOSOPHY 338-49 (1996).
2 2 8 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLrICAL CONFLICr 3-7 (1996); see
also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 346-61 (1996)
(developing a dialogic theory that the good will emerge from open and robust deliberation).
229 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentwy Constitution, 147 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 83 (1998) ("We are going to disagree about shared values."); Jane S. Schacter,
Poised at the Threshold: Sexual Orientation, Law, and the Law School Curriculum in the
Nineties, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1910, 1922 (1994) ("Left-inspired calls for shared communal
values create a dilemma. While progressive communitarians frequently make such arguments
in defense of gay rights, these claims recall-ominously, if unintentionally-the conservative
defense of community values that so strongly characterized the Hardwick majority opinion.!).
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preferences. It recognizes that the majority can be wrong.
Instead, determinations of "the good" in shared humanity theory require a
rationalist approach. They should be based on the best available empirical
evidence in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. I and others have
argued that reasoned inquiry, according to the criteria of the scientific method,
and the collection of cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence from
a variety of disciplines, is the most egalitarian epistemological method for
deciding difficult questions of value.230
When we decide what criteria to use, shared humanity theory does not just
assume that the traditionally accepted-i.e. heterosexual-norms are the
standard. Instead, shared humanity asks the decisionmaker to discard all
preconceptions and look to see what standards have been scientifically
demonstrated to matter to the decision. If the issue is whether an individual
should be permitted to adopt a child, a humanist theory using rationalist
methodology would inquire into those qualifies that make a good parent2 31 If the
question is whether an individual should be permitted to many, a theory of
shared humanity would look not to the religious practices or policies for
marriage, but the humanist values of cohesion and familial belonging2 32 Shared
humanity is not a matter of looking for equivalences between straights and
sexual minorities; it is a searching inquiry for the best features of humanity,
when "best" is defined rationally, empirically, and humanistically. Within this
framework, some identity-based differences may be relevant to promotion of the
collective.
Consider as an example the gay parent custody and adoption cases. It is an
example that indicates the ways in which empirical answers-guided by reason
and the cumulative, comprehensive, and converging evidence from a variety of
23 0 See Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific
Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 266-74 (1989) (elaborating the ways in which reason as
scientific inquiry can provide an appropriate deliberative method for questions of morality and
value differences and explaining that scientific knowledge is not majoritarian); Toni M.
Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45,48 (1996) (maintaining that reason
and empathy should be the touchstones for expansion of gay rights: "[IThe root of most
opposition to gay rights ... is not legal doctrine per se, but judges' failures to approach matters
involving human sexuality by using available social science research, and their broader failure
to empathize with those whose sexual identity and desires are not exclusively heterosexual");
Vargas, supra note 132, at 221-25 (identifying the problem of judicial epistemological
privileging but suggesting that judges are able to engage in "reasoned elaboration").
23 1 See infra text accompanying note 234.
2 32 A variety of anthropologists have noted the centrality and importance across cultures
of families. See, e.g., BRONISLAW MAUNOwsla, A SCENTIC THEORY OF CULTURE AND
OTER ESSAYS 62 (1944); John U. Ogbu, Origins of Human Competence: A Cultural-
EcologicalPerspective, 52 CHILDDEVEL. 413,414-15 (1981).
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disciplines-will differ from moral majoritarian answers.
Many of the cases in which gay parents have been successful in retaining
custody, visitation rights, or pursuing adoption under a formal equality model
have depended on the parent minimizing or making irrelevant the fact of his or
her homosexuality.233 To obtain or preserve custody, gays and lesbians have
been forced to emulate heterosexuals.
A humanist theory would not indulge in the heterosexual masquerade
compelled by the formal equality model. Instead, it would encourage courts to
look first to see whether any parent seeking custody, visitation, or a prospective
parent seeking to adopt possesses those features that available social science
evidence suggests are indicative of good parenting: stability, constancy,
nurturing ability, and other child-rearing skills. 234 It would also necessitate
tackling any negative constructions of difference, such as concerns about the
psychosocial development of children raised by gay and lesbian parents.235 The
theory would then ask whether any features of a parent's lifestyle might
positively promote the best interests of the child. This inquiry would permit, for
instance, consideration of the extended kinship communities that characterize
some gay and lesbian relationships.
According to anthropologist Kath Weston, one feature of some gay and
lesbian relationships is the development of families of choice that are not
necessarily centered on biological relatives, but include stable, enduring,
affectionate, and interdependent relations with friends and ex-lovers, and strong
ties to a larger supportive community. 236 Children are raised in a strong social
233 See, e.g., Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Irish v. Irish,
300 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Mich. CL App. 1981); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 SE.2d 775, 777
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); A. v. A.,
514 P.2d 358, 360 (Or. CL App. 1973); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691,692 (Va. 1985); see also Strasser, supra note 145,
at 867-69 & n.217 (1997) (cataloguing cases and referring specifically to one Tennessee case
in which the court questioned the nine-year-old daughter to see if the mother and her lesbian
lover hugged each other, kissed each other, or said they love each other in the presence of the
child).
234 See, e.g., GEORGE W. HOLDEN, PARENTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF CHU.D REARING 146
tbl.7.1 (1997) (parental encouragement of emotional expression relates to child competence);
RONALD HUXLEY, LOVE & LvOTS: ACHEVING A BALANCE IN PARENTING 129 (1998) (use of
action and relationship discipline increases independence and provides emotional security and
freedom for children).
2 35 See Ball & Pea, supra note 145, at 291-99; Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E.
Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Children: Implications of Social Science Research
for Policy, 52 J. Soc. IssuEs 29, 29, 41 (1986) (demonstrating that studies show that children
in the care of lesbian and gay parents develop normally).
236 See KATH WEsTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHiP 29 (1991)
("Lesbians and gay men.., lay claim to a distinctive type of family characterized as families
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network, and the division of labor in these relationships is egalitarian and not tied
to traditional gender patterns. Even though families of affinity may be formed in
response to social alienation or estrangement from genetic families, these
families offer choice, supportive acceptance, and economic and decisional
independence often not found in traditional family groupings. African American
and Indian experiences add to the evidence that children raised in extended
families or nongenetic communities have a rich sense of identity and security.237
Thus, an appropriate inquiry for a court in an adoption case would be
whether this particular prospective adoptive parent was part of an extended
kinship community that might provide a larger, stable, more caring extended
family structure for the child. This is an argument for the preservation of cultural
differences--those that contribute to other virtues, such as security, stability, and
belonging-even if those differences have grown up in response to
subordination. This provides an example of the way shared humanity theory can
validate gay identity or various forms of familial relationships.
C. Dangers ofHomogenizing Strategies
Shared humanity theory builds on core human desires and virtues. It looks
for the ways in which we-all of us including gays, lesbians, bisexuals, straights,
transsexuals, women, men, racial and religious minorities and majorities-are
alike while taking into account the effects of differences. In considering the
effects of differences, humanist theory pays specific attention to the socially
constructed nature of differences: what cultural and legal disadvantages are
attached to differences, and what advantages flow from differences? The answer
offered by shared humanity theory is, in part, an assimilationist one; it seems to
ambiguate the meaning of heterosexuality and homosexuality. This Section
considers the dangers of homogenizing strategies in general and of searching for
we choose or create:); see also HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND
OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH Us 25 (1996) (explaining that children need an intact and
cohesive family which is dependable); SIMON LEVAY & ELISABEfH NONAS, CITY OF FRIENDS:
A PORTRAIT OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY IN AMERICA 393 (1995) (describing the
social bonds and solidarity in the gay and lesbian community).
237 See ELMER P. MARTIN & JOANNE MITCHELL MARTIN, THE BLACK ExTENDED FAMILY
10 (1978); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY 90-94 (1975) (explaining that extended kinship networks in black communities
give children stability); Joyce E. McConnell, Securing the Care of Children in Diverse
Families: Building on Trends in Guardianship Reform, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 51-58
(1998); see also Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community: A
Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1658-67 (1995)
(discussing the ways in which the extended family structure of black families is child-focused,
offers shared parenting opportunities and develops deep connections between children and
elders).
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central defining traits of personhood in the context of the experiences of sexual
outsiders.
There are multiple challenges with any strategy that searches for sameness:
Can we seek assimilation while retaining distinctive experiential differences?
How can the lens of sameness ever lead to the recognition and acceptance of
differences? Does the sameness strategy necessarily minimize the relevance of
gay identities? The answers to these questions depend in large part on what is
meant by "sameness"--sameness in what ways, along what dimensions, for what
purposes.
Sexual minorities in particular have reason to be apprehensive about
assimilationist strategies. They are encouraged in some instances and coerced in
others into "converting" their sexual orientation, passing, or otherwise remaining
invisible.238 Assimilationist theories have been criticized in the areas of race,
gender, and sexual orientation, principally because homologizing models ignore
distinctive cultural identities and valorize the choices of the dominant culture.239
In its search for essential similarities, shared humanity theory seems to compel
the diminishment of differences. Diane Helene Miller makes this claim in the
context of Roberta Achtenberg's successful nomination to the post of assistant
secretary for Housing and Urban Development. Miller argues that when
Achtenberg's supporters maintained that her sexuality was irrelevant to her
qualifications for the position, they diminished the political significance of her
appointment and dismissed this aspect of her identity "because although it is a
difference, it does not make a difference." 240
Furthermore, if a focus on common ground does not repress differences, it
seems to create a hierarchy in which sameness comes first and differences are
perpetually relegated to second place. At worst, it risks the hazards of forced
assimilation, at best, the nominal recognition of differences. A pure sameness
strategy can backfire, become the basis for dismissing differences that do matter,
or create an "indifference to difference." 241
238 See Yoshino, supra note 33, at 500-04.
239 See Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes
Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV. 813,
839-45 (1993); Yoshino, supra note 33, at 501-03; see also WHILIAM M. NEMAN,
AMERICAN PLURALISM: A STUDY OF MINORIY GROUPS AN SOCIAL THEORY 59 (1973)
(describing assimilation by immigrant groups, where "[t]he central tenet ... was that new
groups must conform to the cultural tradition of the majority or dominant group").
2 4 0 DIANE HELENE MILLER, FREEDOM TO DFER: THE SHAPING OF THE GAY AND
LESBIAN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 48 (1998).
241 Thompson-Schneider, supra note 89, at 24-26.
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D. Realizing a Vision of Common Humanity
These potential critiques misunderstand both the premises and the
epistemology of shared humanity theory. The theory does not suggest the
assimilation of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transsexuals into the dominant
heterosexual culture. It encourages instead a new search for human similarities.
A theory of common humanity also avoids the bipolar categories and thinking
that have come to characterize identity jurisprudence and, in the gay legal theory
area, the failure of existing categories to conceive of gender hybrids.2
42
As Robin West succinctly states, "What heterosexual and homosexual
citizens are universally-what we naturally share, and what we have in
common-swamps in importance and magnitude this difference of sexual
preference, orientation, or tilt."243 Shared humanity theory believes we can
examine and build on this plane of common human needs, desires, impulses,
activities, and abilities, without sacrificing distinctive differences of both groups
and of individuals within those groups.244
1. The Recognition ofEqual Worth and Dignity
As an example of the ways in which a theory of shared humanity would
operate in legal decisionmaking-and the ways it would depart from the formal
equality model-consider the not so hypothetical circumstance of antigay
protests. My home state of Kansas houses in its capital city, Topeka, a virulently
antigay pastor named Fred Phelps. Phelps is a pastor of the Westboro Baptist
church in Topeka. He is a disbarred lawyer. And he is a hatemonger who thinks
that Pat Robertson and George Bush are "lukewarm cowards."245 He pickets
funerals of gays and lesbians with signs saying "AIDS CURES FAGS, NO
TEARS FOR QUEERS, FAGS BURN IN HELL," and 'TAGS DIE, GOD
LAUGHS.3246
242 See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACALS, AND OTHER MIsFns
UNDER AMERICAN LAW 233-34 (1996).
243 West, supra note 92, at 1320.
244 See Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Penpective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 43-45 (1994) (warning against creating an image
of the "essential lesbian").
245 Westboro Baptist Church Web Site, FAQ, Oast modified Apr. 24,2000) <http'J/www.
godhatesfags.corn/faq.html>.
246 See Westboro Baptist Church Web Site, Photos/Images Oast modified Apr. 24, 2000)
<httpJ/vwv.godhatesfags.com/photost>. Among the cars parked outside the family compound
is one emblazoned with a vanity license plate spelling out "PRECTH8" ('preached hate"). The
Phelps Compound, (visited Apr. 24,2000) <http.//www.turnleftcomphelps>.
The Phelps' crusade is not as isolated as one might hope. See, e.g., Christian Group
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The day before Matthew Shepard's funeral, which Phelps and some
members of his church picketed, the City Council in Casper, Wyoming, adopted
a fifty foot no protest or buffer zone for all funerals in the city. The city attorney
said his office had to quickly research the law of abortion protests and buffer
zones. '"During that week," the attorney said, "we were living in a constitutional
exam in law school." 247 Perhaps it is an occupational hazard, this uncontrollable
impulse to grade constitutional law exams, but I thought "C+, maybe B-."
The City Council found parallels between the oppressed groups and saw
buffer zones as a reasonable way of accommodating the choice interests of
women seeking abortions and the privacy and dignity interests of funeral
participants and the First Amendment interests of protestors. A theorist using
traditional equal protection categories to evaluate differences between
disempowered groups might question why the council picked the most limited
buffer zone. Other cases in the abortion area have upheld buffer zones of 100
feet 248
But, let us consider in somewhat more depth the use of buffer zones in the
case of funeral picketers. This is the point at which shared humanity theory
offers a different way of thinking about the question-one not based initially on
the identity of the plaintiff. Why not recognize that even a viewpoint-specific
restriction in a traditional public forum is necessary to serve a compelling
interest of avoiding desecration of a funeral when the only purpose of the speech
Distributes Anti-Homosexual Literature, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 5, 1996, at ID (describing activities
of Wisconsin Christians United passing out leaflets calling homosexuality 'a filthy scourge'
and depict[ing] gay people as disease carriers and serial killers" and Oregon Citizens Alliance,
"a radical religious right organization that wants to repeal all gay rights ordinances, and halt
any further progress in the gays and lesbians rights movement for equal rights.").
247 Laurie Asseo, Shepard Funeral a Test for Casper, DENVER PosT, Nov. 20, 1998, at
38A.
248 See, e.g., Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1520-21 (8th Cir. 1996) (city could
restrict residential picketing in front of a targeted residence and adjacent residences, with lots
75 feet in width, to protect neighborhood tranquility as long as picketing allowed on opposite
side of street); United States v. Lindgren, 883 F. Supp. 1321, 1333-34 (D.N.D. 1995)
(approving 100-foot buffer zone around clinic, clinic employees, and employees' homes). But
see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 357-58 (1997) (upholding
fixed 15 foot buffer zones, striking floating 15 foot buffer zones); Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 754-56 (1994) (upholding an injunction establishing a 36 foot
buffer zone on a public street outside a facility providing abortion services, but striking a 300
foot buffer zone around residences of abortion clinic staff); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591,
606 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (striking down 200 foot residential no protest zone); Kirkeby v. Fumess,
52 F.3d 772, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Scott, No. 3:95CV1216 (AHN),
1998 WL 386483, *3-*5 (D. Conn. June 25, 1998) (refusing to expand a fixed buffer zone
around clinic from 28 to 56 feet).
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is to inflict emotional injury. The Supreme Court held in Frisby v. Schultz, 249
"[tihere simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling
listener."250 As in Friby, the funeral picketing threatens the psychological and
physical well-being of the funeral-goers who are held "captive" by the
circumstances of the funeral (it's only going to happen once and only in one
place). Why not prohibit funeral picketing within thirty minutes before and thirty
minutes after a scheduled service?251
Shared humanity theory does not overlook distinctive features of identity,
but focuses instead on situational differences: differences with respect to the
purpose of the governmental regulation. Of course, there may be important
differences between those seeking abortions and funeralgoers. Perhaps buffer
zones for abortion protestors make some sense: they allow picketers to come
within the hearing range of those seeking abortion services, to allow the picketers
the possibility of changing minds (although some of us might want to better
recognize the vulnerability of a frightened, pregnant sixteen-year-old girl forced
to run a gauntlet of angry adults with bullhorns). But, does precisely the same
buffer zone for a picketer at a funeral of a gay or lesbian make sense? The
picketer is not going to convince the mourners not to care or convince the
decedent not to be gay or lesbian.
A humanist theory would turn instead toward considerations of equal worth
and dignity and respect for all persons. The picketer's purposes are to preach
hate, to desecrate the funeral, and to intrude on the private grief of family and
friends mourning their loss. Even portrayed in the most favorable light, the
protest's purpose of sending a public message claiming that homosexuality is
immoral is one that can be served in other places and at other times. Gay
relationships, chosen families, and biological and legal families are entitled to
equal worth and respect, particularly at their most vulnerable times of grief.
Cushioning families against grief-providing in some circumstances
compensation for it and creating elaborate rituals to assist survivors-is a human
value that crosses time and cultures, and it is one worthy of respect.252
249 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (ordinance prohibiting focused picketing in front of a
particular residence not unconstitutional); see also Portland Feminist Women's Health Center
v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681,686-87 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding as content-neutral
a reasonable time, place or manner restriction on speech an injunction against "shouting,
screaming, chanting, or yelling" by anti-abortion protestors in a modified form). But see Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312-13 (1988) (compelling interest not narrowly tailored in protecting
dignity of foreign officials and thus strildng District of Columbia provision prohibiting signs
critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of embassies).
250 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
251 Se, e.g., Ronald C. Griffin, Equality: Nibbling Around the Edges, 34 WASHBURN LJ.
460,470 (1995) (urging prohibiting picketing 30 minutes before and after church services).
252 See, e.g., MICHAEL C. KEARL, ENDINGS: A SOCIOLOGY OF DEATH AND DYING 95
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Irrespective of identity categories, why in the name of the Constitution must we
permit Fred Phelps to feast on the grief of others?
2. Identification, Empathy, and Acceptance ofDifferences
Many constitutional cases brought by sexual outsiders are equal protection
challenges to invidious distinctions created by legislation. A critical feature of
this humanist approach is that regarding a challenge to a particular legal
distinction, we can emphasize sameness regarding the purposes of that
distinction without accepting the idea of sameness overall. Shared humanity
theory thus accepts the idea that what sets gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and
transsexuals apart in a heterosexual culture are their experiential differences, but
urges that the disadvantaging of those differences is the point at which sameness
or difference analysis is most useful.
Critics might argue that it sacrifices an important part of gay or lesbian
identity to stress what is the same about homosexuals and heterosexuals rather
than what is different. Searching for shared features of humanity asks a slightly
different question: What are the central, defining traits of humanity-relative to a
particular law-keeping in mind the overarching principle of respecting the
differences of identity. This does not risk assimilation as absorption. Shared
humanity encourages assimilation plus visibility, not hiding sexual identity, but
making visible what we are proud of in relation to a particular legal
classification: What makes a good parent, a good soldier, a good union that the
state should recognize.
This is one way that theorists can both present gay relationships as positive
and make law reflect our lived experiences. Preserving status differences
between homosexuals and heterosexuals requires the depiction of homosexuals
as moral deviants. If gay legal theorists and litigators show homosexuals,
bisexuals, and transsexuals as warm, well-adjusted, nurturing, loving people, this
will begin to combat perverse cultural representations. 253
Several legal theorists question the prospects for empathetic understanding
(1989); IAN MORRIS, KEY THEMES IN ANCIENT HISTORY: DEATH-RrrUAL AND SOCIAL
STRU IrRE IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUTY 1-3 (1992) (using burial to examine social structure of
cultures).
253 See, e.g., In the Matter of Evan, 153 Misc.2d 884, 885 (N.Y. Fan. Ct. 1992) ("Diane
F. and Valerie C., have lived together in a committed, long-term relationship, which they
perceive as permanent, for the past 14 years .... Both home studies describe Diane as a warn,
loving and nurturing woman who is committed to Evan and is an effective parent to him.);
Butler, supra note 72, at 868 ("In the late 1980s approximately three million gays and lesbians
were parents, and between eight and ten million children were being raised in gay or lesbian
households.').
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to solve the problems of outsider groups.2 54 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic
describe what they term the "empathic fallacy," the misguided belief "that we
can enlarge our sympathies through linguistic means alone."255 One limitation of
empathy, according to Delgado and Stefancic, is that it operates best in a time
warp-we are only able to escape the dominant narrative and received
understandings through the distance of time. So we can understand that prejudice
of a prior generation is wrong, but we are limited in the ability to objectively
view our own contemporary prejudices.256 They also make the point that speech
is limited in its ability to cure prejudices because the standard stories are so
deeply ingrained that they rebuff new narratives as "extreme, coercive, political
and wrong."257 It is too easy, Delgado points out, to slip into "false empathy," in
which a majority group member "pretends to understand and sympathize" but
actually "has a shallow identification with the other."258
The solutions Delgado urges in the context of race are for whites to become
race traitors and to work on subverting white consciousness from within the
white race group.259 These are strategies that can be adapted and used in the area
of sexual orientation, if straights are willing to claim membership as sexual
minorities, by, for example, describing attacks on gays and lesbians as attacks on
"us." These strategies for ambiguating the meaning of sexual identity deserve
greater exploration. But while these are promising tactics for akeady committed
liberals, the greater challenge is to develop strategies that will work for the great
majority of conservative judges, jurors, and lay people. Although Delgado has
carefully elaborated and thoughtfully cautioned about the hazards of false
empathy, I am not as willing as he is to jettison the prospects of cultivating real
254 See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2125 (1989) ("The guideposts for assigning our
priorities are missing in the empathy literature.); Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder, Gentler
Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. Cm. L.
REV. 929, 944 (1994) (arguing that projective empathy and diversity "do not mix well,"
because individuals "can fully empathize only with others whose self-developing experiences
are at least closely analogous to its own"). Theorists outside law have also questioned the "gap
between empathy and acting on another's behalf." Megan Boler, The Risks of Empathy:
Interrogating Multiculturalism's Gaze, 11 CULURAL STUD. 253, 255 (1997).
2 55 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1261
(1992).
256 Id at 1277-79.
257 Id at 1279.
258 Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84
CAL L. REV. 61, 71-72 (1996).
259 Id at 95-100.
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identification360
Available social science evidence suggests that creating understanding about
identity differences is a process that requires initial identification with other-
group members.2 61 It is easier to understand the situations of others or take their
perspective when one perceives others as "having their own goals, interests, and
affects"; in short, as Lynne Henderson explains, "the reality is that we are more
likely to empathize with people similar to ourselves."262 Delgado makes this
point as well, saying that "[W]e find it easy to empathize with the victims of
crime... particularly if they are middle-class people like us" '263 The challenge
is how to cultivate true feelings of 'people like us" so that majority group
members-and not just the leffist, already sympathetic fringe-are willing to
become race, gender, or sexual orientation traitors.
This identification can be a sense of shared humanity rather than any
particular association with characteristics of other-group members. Studies of
gentiles who rescued Jews during the Holocaust "found that they were motivated
to act altruistically on behalf of others by their identification with a 'globalized'
humanity."264 From this initial identification comes the ability to perceive the
differing experiences of another person. 65
If the stepping stone to empathetic understanding lies in identification, the
concern is where this leaves differences. Cynthia Ward makes this point in
260 Id at 95 ("persons of radically different background and race cannot be made
vicariously to identify with us to any significant extenf). john a. powell makes a similar point:
"Delgado actually seems to be describing a semiconscious falseness masquerading as empathy.
While Professor Delgado identifies a problem that should give us pause, it should not detract
from the possibility of real empathy." john a. powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The
Delimitation ofHarmfulSpeech in a Democratic Society, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 97, 113 (1998).
261 See, e.g., MicHAEL A. HOCG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS 92-115
(1988); Kohn, supra note 201, at 118-19. Other research in social psychology suggests that
almost everyone-including small children and even infants-possesses empathetic ability, but
that adults vary in their capacity to exercise this trait See Joan E. Grusec, The Socialization of
Altruism, in PROSOCIAL BEHAviOR 9-29 (Margaret S. Clark ed., 1991).
262 Henderson, supra note 214, at 1581, 1584.
263 Delgado, supra note 258, at 89.
264 Dorothy E. Roberts, Sources of Commitment to Social Justice, 4 ROGER WILIAMS U.
L. REV. 175, 202 (1998) (citing Kristen R. Monroe et al., Altruism and the Theory of Rational
Action: Rescuers ofJews in Nazi Europe, 101 ETh'Cs 103 (1990)).
265 See ARNOLD P. GOLDMEN & GERALD Y. MICHAELS, EMPATHY: DEVELOPMENT,
TRAINING, AND CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (1985); see also Mark A. Barnett, Empathy and Related
Responses in Children, in EMPATHY AND rrs DEVELOPMENT 146, 154-55 (Nancy Eisenberg &
Janet Strayer, eds. 1987) (noting that encouraging perceptions of similarities to others by
promoting "values that emphasize the cormectedness among all people" can heighten
empathetic abilities and lead to responsiveness to different others).
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political theory, as she questions whether empathy can be the "thdeoretical glue"
to reconcile liberalism and cOmMunitarism. 266 Empathy, says Ward, cannot
serve at once the interests of equality and diversity. She distinguishes between
"projective empathy" that acknowledges the "essential humanity" of other
people, thus aclmowledging their equality, and "imaginative empathy" that
envisions others as autonomous and separate, thus recognizing their diversity.267
But Ward's concerns center on using the psychological concept of empathy to
mediate conflicting goals of liberalism and communitarianism in political
theory.268 She never disputes that the actual operation of empathy as a
psychological concept is a process in which one develops understanding of a
different other through interest identification,269 and then moves from making
conscious identifications to elaborating about the distinctive personal history and
position of the other, thus recognizing the other's differences.270 Thus the
process of empathizing entails both "recognition of oneself in another" and
perceiving the distinct other. 271
In practice, then, how can an attorney cultivate an empathetic response for
her client who is a flamboyant drag queen or a butch dyke? What happens when
you want a judge to put himself into the shoes of a transvestite? What about
queers who "practice promiscuity as sexual revolution" and may not be in a
committed or stable partnership, but who wish to adopt a child?272 The decision
that might need to be committed to an interpretation of available social science
evidence is whether promiscuity and child-rearing have any relation. Does
promiscuity (and by what definition-a different partner each night or month or
year?) when practiced by individuals of any sexual orientation, conflict with
good parenting?
Shared humanity theory runs the risk that it will be perceived as a public
relations campaign--"Let's send the effeminate queens back to the closet so that
people who look like suburban America will lead the movement for equal rights.
That's the way to fool America into believing we're just like them."--and the
26 6 Ward, supra note 254, at 931.
267 Id. at 949.
26 8 See id at 934-35 n.19 ("These definitions may not, of course, reflect the way the
concept of empathy is used in other fields, such as psychology. In this essay I... argue
that.. . the attempted transfer of empathy from a psychological to a political concept creates
intractable problems").
269 See R.M. HAR, MORALTHMN]NG: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND PoIwr 124-28 (1981).
270 See Tony Komer, Making Conscious Identifications: A Means of Promoting
Empathic Contact, 27 AuST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 115, 117 (1993).
271 i
272 Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and
Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEx. 83, 112 (1994).
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parallel risk that to the extent that it is effective, it will favor only the most
mainstream of sexual others.
It is undeniable that a strategy of sameness may well work best with
mainstream sexual minorities. If people tend to empathize best with others who
they perceive are like them, the least-threatening examples may move people
past the barriers of fear and ignorance. But shared humanity theory encourages
the search for human unity in ways that transcend the differences of sexual
identity, race, class, or gender.
Perhaps one way to search for commonalities while focusing on
differences-to keep humanist strategies from slipping into mainstreaning-is
to concentrate greater attention on gender hybrids or the transgendered, who, as
Jean Love says, "are about as far 'outside' the law as you can get in the United
States today. '273 In this respect, tanssexuals seem to be where gays and lesbians
were a quarter of a century ago: still classed as deviant in the social sciences and
suffering from "gender identity disorder."2 74 The transgendered are only
beginning to incorporate their history and stories into the social fabric. 275
Relatively little legal scholarship focuses on the experiences of gender
hybrids. 276 If middle America can see the ways in which transsexuals are
"people like us," this seemingly conformist strategy takes on a subversive twist.
As theorists, we need to begin more actively incorporating the works of the
transgendered into legal theory and their narratives in our consciousness.
Consider, for instance, the books and speeches of Leslie Feinberg. Feinberg self-
describes as a "masculine, lesbian, female-to-male cross-dresser and
transgenderist," and says s/he often feels "pronoun-challenged' 277 In Trans
Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue, Feinberg describes the difficulties of
difference, but focuses on shared experiences that transcend differences of
2 73 Jean C. Love, The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 1
GENDERRACE & JUST. 87,96 (1998).
274 AMERICAN PsYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOsIC AND STATIsTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DIsORDERS 537-38 (4th ed. rev. 1994).
275 See, e.g., PAT CALIFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLMCS OF TRANSGENDERMSM (1997);
MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BisExuALrry AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE
(1995); THIRD SEX, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN CULTURE AND HISTORY
(Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994); ANDREW VACCHS, CHOICE OF Evii. (1999); Dierdre McCloskey,
Happy Endings: Law, Gender, and the University, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 77 (1998).
276 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Stories from the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-
Discrimination Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1321, 1342-51 (1998) (relating various stories of
female to male transsexuals); Colker, supra note 210; Drobac, supra note 108; Rachel Haynes,
Bisexual Jurisprudence: A Tripolar Approach to Law and Society, 5 MICH. . GENDER & L.
229 (1999); Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor: The Collision of Sex and Gender,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 835 (1995).
2 77 LSLEFE ERG, TRANs LBERATION: BEYOND PINK ORBLUE 19 (1998).
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identity, such as the difficulties that we face when trying to make our lives
conform to the boxes on official forms:
[Many] of us... sit in front of an application trying to figure out which of two
boxes to check off--"F' or '%"-neither of which exactly fits our lives and our
self-identities. You could write down "not applicable" or "none of the above! or
"all of the above" next to those two little boxes, but it won't get you a job. It
won't get you a driver's license. It won't get you a passport 278
These sorts of evocative passages begin to change the means we use to shape
law. Perhaps shared humanity offers something more and different than
mainstream identification: it shifts the focus to look past differences of dress,
speech, manner, and sexual choices toward similarities of human belonging.
This focus on lived experiences, our "realities" rather than rhetorical tactics,
as Evan Wolfson puts it,279 may be a way to move academics and litigators
toward a joint goal in re-presenting the lives of sexual outsiders. Wolfson makes
the point that liberationist academics are too willing to dismiss strategies they
characterize as "assimilationist" without considering the pragmatic realities of
the arguments that work with legislators and judges. "One of our jobs in
persuasion," Wolfson says, "is to go where the audience is, find them, and bring
them along to where we want them to be. 280
V. CoNcLusION: GAY LEGAL THEORY AND CULTURAL CHANGE
Envisioning our shared humanity is a broader proposition, really, than
simply arguing for equal treatment of lesbians, gays, and the transgendered
through an assimilationist strategy that has as an integral part a respect for
differences. The broader project is about prizing human relationships, realizing a
vision of a common humanity, and developing a sense of responsibility for the
human collective.
A theory of jurisprudence that requires compassion for fellow humans will
call for changing fundamental principles in many areas of law other than
constitutional law and sex discrimination. A humanist theory that commands an
ethic of collective responsibility would prescribe, for example, abolition of the
no duty to rescue rule in tort law. We need to require of strangers what Anglo-
American law has "persistently refused to impose... the moral obligation of
2 78 Id at 68.
279 Wolfson, supra note 79, at 592-97,599-603,608-10.
280 Interview vith Evan Wolfson, Marriage Project Director, Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund (July 26, 1999).
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common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger."281
The recognition of personhood requires a particular attitude toward others that
does not end with a vision of common humanity in a single country or continent.
Obligations to the human race are more global still. 282
Mainstreaming or "insider" strategies--tactics that depict gays and lesbians
as similar to rather than different from heterosexuals-have been behind some of
the most significant political successes of the gay rights movement. 83 Activists
worked within existing structures to gain social and legal recognition, stressing
the shared needs of families to urge corporations, for example, to provide
partnership benefits.284 These strategies of sameness seemed a sensible means of
garnering cultural legitimacy, but they came with a price. They left heterosexual
norms unexplored, overlooked sexual minorities who did not resemble
heterosexuals, and omitted any discussions of subtle gender and sexual
stereotyping.285
Shared humanity theory attempts to move beyond comparisons to a
heterosexual norm by focusing on human commonalities. It would emphasize
fundamental human traits and values that are worth promoting-love, caring,
relationships between humans, respect for persons. This is not a strategy that
encourages assimilation to conform to traditional structures defined by a
heterosexual culture. It is a project that encourages recognition of our common
humanity, but also demands continual questioning of constructions of sameness
281 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 56, at 375
(5th ed. 1984).
282 This proposition is demonstrated in numerous human rights instruments. See, e.g.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 71, U.N. Doe. E1800
(1948).
283 This has been the strategy behind campaigns to secure protective state and local
ordinances. See, e.g., Peter M. Cicchino et al., Sex, Lies, and Civil Rights: A Critical History of
the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 549, 567 (1991)
(maintaining that the successful passage of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill was due to
the nonthreatening depiction of gays and lesbians as "apart from their sexual orientation, not
much different from the general population"); see also supra text at notes 259-60. It was the
basis of the student group first amendment cases, see supra text at notes 175-76, the approach
used in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, at 65-68 (Haw. 1993), and the mechanism behind
municipalities and corporations providing domestic partner benefits. See Andrew Koppelman,
Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921,989 (1998).
284 VAID, supra note 32, at 10 ("Some of the biggest successes of the gay rights
movement came in the 1990's through changes in corporate policies that covered thousands of
employees?).
285 See supra text accompanying notes 90-122.
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and difference and constant inquiry into the qualities and characteristics we want
to promote. This is part of the transformative project: it encourages the re-
envisioning of and a departure from the traditional and categorical defining traits
in both theory and doctrine.
Gay legal theorists have been somewhat skeptical of universalizing
strategies, fearing that any approach that developed "a basic concept of human
commonality across sexual differences"--while vital--would be limited in its
recognition of experiential differences. 8 6 Modem evidence from social
psychology, though, suggests that true (not false, shallow, or super-ordinating)
empathic understanding of differences begins in identification, the process of
recognizing similarities.28 7
Humanization, though, does not require homogenization. Efforts toward
humanization must include changing the cultural re-presentations of sexual
minorities. This necessitates increasing visibility, combating untrue media
representations, and replacing the dominant cultural images with more accurate
portrayals of the lived experiences of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
transsexuals. 2 s8 Humanizing strategies must include exposing the framework of
intolerance. This entails disputing the myth that tolerance is increasing,2 89
unraveling rhetorical devices, such as the "special rights" metaphor, that divert
attention from human conditions,290 and exploring what is meant by
"tolerance." 291 This means confronting acts of seeming tolerance, such as the
deceptively sympathetic campaign for "curative therapy" to change the sexual
orientation of nonheterosexuals. 292 It also means deconstructing tolerance itself,
rather than accepting the idea that mere tolerance-nose-holding, bone-tossing
286 Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-
Rights Era, 110 HARv. L. REv. 684,722 (1997).
287 See supra text accompanying notes 256-58.
2 88 See Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay
Rights Movement, 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REV. 723, 725-29 (1993) (arguing that the
conversation about gay rights began with visibility); VAID, supra note 32, at 196 (noting that
the media "reproduce values, which confer and define meaning, and which shape human
imagination").
289 See supra text accompanying notes 17-47.
290 See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 85.
291 See McClain, supra note 31.
292 GLAAD Director Joan M. Garry explains that the ex-gay conversion campaign is not
about tolerance: "their message isn't really about 'hope' or 'healing' or 'understanding,' but
rather, about intolerance, deception and moral bankruptcy. This new campaign represents what
has become a relentless, well-financed and reprehensible assault on the lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender community."
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tolerance or tolerance "lite"--is acceptable2 93
Humanization may be most effective at the grass roots political level with
nonlitigative strategies.294 Small, local campaigns, such as urging city councils
to pass antidiscrimination ordinances may be more promising in creating a vision
of shared humanity. The Louisville, Kentucky experience illustrates the point
After close to a decade of effort, the Louisville Board of Aldermen passed the
"Fairness Ordinance" in January of 1999, which added sexual orientation to the
list of bases upon which employers cannot discriminate.295 Conversations with
the 'Fairness Alliance" group that sponsored the ordinance indicate they won it
through old-fashioned, grass-roots politics. They elected an alderman here,
turned out a hostile one there, and gradually transformed the Board. Then they
humanized the issue when there was a high-profile case of a lesbian fired from
her job, and the tide was turmed.2 96 Lexington, Kentucky followed Louisville's
lead, and other counties are looking at the Louisville and Lexington example.297
Across the nation, more than one hundred cities and counties have passed
antidiscrimination ordinances. 298 Of course, this sort of reform is both piecemeal
and partial, as the Louisville experience demonstrates: the Louisville ordinance
protects gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, but does not
prohibit discrimination in housing or public accommodations. But perhaps in
developing broad jurisprudential theories, we have paid too little attention to the
transformative power of nonjudicial efforts.
The common theme of all of these suggested efforts is to humanize sexual
minorities. One of the worst effects, both legally and culturally, of laws that
reflect intolerance or of the absence of laws that prohibit intolerance is the
objectification of people. Dismantling prejudice is a complex process that
requires social action, publicity, and changes in legal rules; the rule changes
become internalized and help develop public conscience.2 99
293 See MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION xi-xii (1997) ('Toleration itself is often
underestimated, as if it is the least we can do for our fellows, the most minimal of their
entitlements. In fact; tolerance (the attitude) takes many different forms, and toleration (the
practice) can be arranged in different ways .... Toleration makes difference possible;
difference makes toleration necessary.").
294 See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 79.
295 Sheldon S. Shafer, Gay Rights Law Open to Interpretation, COURIER-J. (Louisville
Ky.), Jan. 28, 1999, at 01B.
296 Interview with Sam Marcosson (June 24, 1999).
2 97 Tom Taylor, Debate on Gay Rights Law Expected in Henderson, EVANSVILLE
COURIER, July 12, 1999, at B1.
298 See Jay Croft & Holly Crenshaw, Gay Pn'de in Atlanta Not an End to Struggle,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 27, 1999, at H1.
299 Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
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Lawmaking may be most effective in altering the obligations of government
or creating new theories of recovery for victims of inequality, somewhat
effective in expressing a standard of morality, and perhaps effective only in the
larger sweep of time in changing the private behavior of individual citizens.3 00
While there are always interpenetrations between law and culture, law seems
most effective in "culture-shifting" when the culture can be persuaded of the
legitimacy of the change.30 1
As the experiences of women and racial minorities demonstrate, the
challenge is to create a culture sympathetic to the constructed nature of
differences. The history of favorable equal protection cases attests that when
courts are convinced of essential similarities, it is easier for them to see the
constructed nature of differences and the disadvantaging that is attached to
differences. The Court in Brown v. Board of Education302 saw school children
being treated differently; the Court in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan30 3 saw nurses, the court in Able v. United States3°4 saw soldiers, and the
Court in Romer v. Evans,3 05 voters.
In short, a broader social consensus in favor of nondiscrimination seems to
develop most readily when it can be established that there is hostile or invidious
antagonism because of a status we all share. Critical theorists are only beginning
to look for these "interconnectivities"-these common structural, economic, and
ideological factors that systematically disadvantage women, racial minorities and
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 374 (1991) ("The main inhibitor of prejudice is the certainty that it will
be remarked and punished.").
30o See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make
Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 972-74 (1997) (discussing that lawmaking has five
goals: (1) to create new rights and remedies for victims; (2) to alter the conduct of the
government; (3) to alter the conduct of citizens and private entities; (4) to express a moral ideal
or standard; and (5) to change cultural attitudes and patterns).
301 Id. at 978.
302 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
303 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (concluding that "the state's policy of excluding males from
MUW's School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment!).
304 968 F. Supp. 850, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the National Defense
Authorization Act's "imposition of unequal conditions on homosexuals ... in the armed forces
is invalid under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution");
see also supra text at notes 218-25.
305 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that Colorado's Amendment Two, which
precludes legislation designed to protect people based on their sexual orientation, violates the
Equal Protection Clause); see also supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
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sexual others.306 Moving from the theorizing about oppression-when we know
that phenomenologies of discrimination may vary widely-to theorizing about
belonging may be the next important step. We need to develop assimilationist
strategies in which sexual identity can still be a major aspect of a person's life
rather than an inconsequential difference.
Law is supposed to be a reflection of our aspirations. Law is reconstructive.
Why can't we use law to reconstruct us as a more tolerant, loving people?
306 See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on
Identities and Inter-Connectiv'ties, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STuD. 25 (1995).
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